

Bergen Scholarly Journal

Judith K. Winn School of Honors
Bergen Community College



Vol. III. 2017



JUDITH K. WINN SCHOOL OF HONORS

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Book, 2011, acrylic on linen, courtesy of ARTStor.org

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I. INTRODUCTION

Kathryn Colombo

Student Editor

Boldly Going Forward: Keeping Scholarship Alive

Scholarship and education are the foundation of modern society. In the United States today, in the era of the so-called “alternative facts” and fake news, scholarship and the sharing of important, factual, even controversial—in fact, especially controversial—ideas is a necessity now more than ever. While many find it disheartening to share their work in such a climate as we have in the States today, this is what makes it all the more worthwhile. By sharing our research, we may combat ignorance, actively participate in the support and advancement of the arts and sciences, and benefit us as individuals, as a community, and as a country.

The mission of the *Bergen Scholarly Journal* is just that: it provides an outlet for the students of Bergen Community College to prepare and present their research in a publication for the betterment of their fellows in the pursuit of higher education for decades to come. One entirely new feature of the publication, however, is its recent recognition by the Library of Congress, which has assigned the *Bergen Scholarly Journal* an ISSN serial number to be used in the Library of Congress Catalog, thus assuring nationwide access to and a broader readership of the journal. The articles published in this document represent some of the finest research performed at the undergraduate level at Bergen Community College.

In the current issue, students tackle ideas of truth, reality, justice and innovation

in a variety of disciplines. One such example of the undergraduate work presented in the journal comes to us from David Hunter in his examination of truth in William Shakespeare's *Henry IV Part 1*. Hunter discusses Shakespeare's use of the fool character to identify truth, the issue of legitimacy of reign faced by the royal family, and the part which truth—specifically, truth in regards to the self—plays in the work. Similarly on the subject of truth, my research paper on the psychological development of dishonesty in children has been admitted to this publication. In my paper, I examine the current work presented in the field on an otherwise under-discussed topic in an attempt to generate greater interest in a subject fundamental to human psychology.

On the topic of innovation, we have Fernanda Jimenez-Cano's paper discussing proto-feminism in the 17th century, specifically through the work of Mexican philosopher, scholar, and poet Sor Juana Ines de la Cruz. Sor Juana is one of the first female writers of the Baroque period, and one of the earliest to write in the Spanish language. A proto-feminist, Sor Juana challenges her contemporary views on gender and, in his contribution, Jimenez Cano clarifies the complex polemic surrounding her views. Similarly, Heineken Daguplo presents an exploration of the work of innovative and often misunderstood poet, Emily Dickinson, as a relatable, though hermitic, writer. Daguplo demonstrates through her scholarship that Dickinson's work, while written from the perspective of a recluse, is indeed largely universal and transcendent of her personal experience and environment.

Developing the focus on justice and contemporary analysis of the past, Juliana Oleksy presents her research into the Irish potato famine. She revisits the

long contested point that the famine was in fact an act of genocide committed by the English against the Irish, specifically for the purpose of advancing the English economy. Similarly, Elvia Ascencio discusses the Virgin of Guadalupe in Gloria Anzaldua's "Coatlalopeuh, She Who Has Dominion over Serpents" and Sandra Cisneros' "Guadalupe the Sex Goddess." In her work, Ascencio presents feminist reactions to the gendered expectations of women as represented in the form of the Virgin of Guadalupe, and reinterprets the Virgin as a version of the native deity Coatlalopeuh and its symbolic consequences for what it means to be a Chicana today.

Finally, Alberto Chamorro closes the journal with his discussion of the use of the simulacra—the simulation of reality—in modern photography. In his examination, Chamorro presents the constructs fabricated by photographers of what we understand to be reality and what this means for our perception of the world.

A special thanks goes to the Editor-in-Chief Dr. Maria Makowiecka, our Director Professor Seamus Gibbons, and to all of the faculty readers who have made this publication possible. Additionally, on behalf of the Judith K. Winn School of Honors students, I would like to thank the School for its continued tradition of academic excellence as well as the great many opportunities it affords us. Ultimately, it is through this time-honored and boldly enacted tradition of research and publication that we can gain further insight into the world around us.

II. PAPERS

The Issue of Truth in *1 Henry IV*

David Hunter

Mentor Dr. Andrew Tomko

The Issue of Truth in 1 Henry IV

What, art thou mad? art thou mad?

is not the truth the truth?

Falstaff - (II. iv. 238-239)

Truth has the potential to be unsettling, so unsettling that it provokes a sense of irrationality. It can also be extremely difficult to pin down; determining what is black and white can become murky gray rather quickly. In Shakespeare's *Henry IV*, when Falstaff raises the issue of truth, he raises a profound question about the theme of the play. While not speaking a word of truth himself, Falstaff still brings up an important theme. All of the major characters in *1 Henry IV* have an issue with truth: Henry IV rules under a cloud because he may not be a legitimate king; Hal may not be worthy of kingship; Hotspur's true nature - noble, loyal, conniving, or rebellious - is questionable; and Falstaff is the master of language and lies. Motives and morality swirl together to create a confounding array of viewpoints and contradictions that cause a wide variety of conflicts. *1 Henry IV* poses an important question: "is not the truth the truth?" (IV.ii.238-239)

A central conflict is caused by Henry IV himself, as he may not be a legitimate king. He is a man who is very concerned with his appearance as ruler. Because he

is worried about the truth of his reign, he uses his eloquence to enhance his stature. He knows the position he is in, and its importance; therefore, his language is poetic and intricate. As a royal character, he speaks in iambic pentameter. His “Sermons are heavy with state and conscious of the speaker’s exalted virtue” (Van Doren 98). As a consequence, he uses his high level of language to appear truthful. In the beginning of the play, he wishes to go to the Holy Land,

To chase these pagans in those holy fields
Over whose acres walk’d those blessed feet
Which fourteen hundred years ago were nail’d
For our advantage on the bitter cross. (I. 1. 24-27)

He desires to go to the Holy Land as a self-imposed penance for the disposal of Richard. In order to prevent misfortune falling on him and his line, he seeks divine intervention as protection. He invokes Christ when he speaks about “those blessed feet...nailed.” Using divine right, under which a king would claim his rule is ordained by God, Henry attempts to seek legitimacy, knowing that the “truth” of his claim is questionable. He believes that by chasing “pagans” out of the Holy Land, he will gain favor with God and legitimacy, which would make him a true ruler. He is a usurper, who must prove that Richard was not a just king, and that he restored order by removing him. Furthermore, he attempts to use Prince Hal vicariously to honor his rule. However, Hal interacts with sordid thieves at a local tavern. This displeases Henry, especially as he compares Hal to Hotspur,

Hal's rival. Henry IV "admires the chivalric honor and courage of young Percy in contrast to the apparently shallow character of his own son, Prince Hal" (McKinney 177). This wedge between the king and his son is very apparent. The king says,

Of my young Harry. O, that it could be proved
That some night-tripping fairy had exchanged
In cradle-clothes our children where they lay,
And called mine "Percy," his "Plantagenet"!

Then would I have his Harry, and he mine (I. i. 85-89)

At this point, Henry's disappointment in Hal is so great that he connects more with Hotspur. He thinks that Hotspur would be the better king, and even considers Hotspur a favored son. The king blinds himself to reality, his created rain clouds blocking his view.

As the play continues, the king fades into the background, overshadowed by Hal, Falstaff, and Hotspur: "Henry IV eventually becomes only a cipher (...) this unforgotten guilt overshadows everything he does" (Dunn 89). He is played by Falstaff and Hal at the tavern. On the battlefield, men wear his coat of arms. Despite being the title character, the truth is that Henry does not carry the weight of the crown. However, there are many ways to interpret this king. "He is viewed from three distinct points of view in *Part 1*: He sees himself as a weary but effective monarch; Hotspur regards him as a dishonorable politician who first deposed a king (as is enacted in *Richard II*) and then betrayed those who helped him do so;

and Falstaff considers him a cold, rigid opponent of comfort and license” (Boyce 249). He is seen by others in different ways. He believes that he is a ruler who will be redeemed in the future. He projects the image of a man who did not seek the crown, but who responded to the country that needed him. In contrast, Hotspur views him as a usurper, who needs to be disposed. Neither of those views is entirely right, for he is so much an afterthought that his true character never shines through.

Henry represents the melancholic temperament, self-deprecating and critical of others, particularly Hal. When Hal comes to reconcile with his estranged father, Henry berates him,

For all the world

As thou art to this hour was Richard then

When I from France set foot at Ravenspurgh,

And even as I was then is Percy now. (III. ii. 96-99)

This passage highlights the father-son dynamic between Henry and Hal. Henry tries to get Hal to commit to being a rightful heir to the throne because Henry needs him to assist in putting down the rebellion. Comparing Hal to Richard, essentially Satan in Henry’s eyes, and the man he has deposed, reveals that he assumes Hal will not be able to rule legitimately. He also knows Hal despises Hotspur and wants to show the disappointment Hal has made him feel again and again in order to make Hal feel guilty. By comparing Hal to his enemy, Richard, and comparing himself to Hal’s enemy, Hotspur, he attempts to get Hal to realize

that he now has to live up to his true role as the future king, to be the son he should be.

Hotspur may be seen as a tragic figure. In that regard, he must be both good and flawed. In Greek tragedy, a staple of a tragic figure is that he have some flaw that dooms him. Shakespeare takes this tradition and applies it to Hotspur. Hotspur's flaw is his hotheadedness. Hotspur does not know when to quit. His use of language is completely unfiltered, leading to destructive consequences. In Act III, there is a possibility that Henry IV would have forgiven him, since he views Hotspur as a better heir than Hal. However, when the alliances needed for the rebellion to succeed start to crumble, Hotspur continues. He is set in his ways; he does not adjust to the situation.

He also insults Owen Glendower, the instigator of the rebellion and supplier of the troops Hotspur so desperately needs to succeed. He blurts out insults. Hotspur's actions stem from self-esteem; truth is what he feels, with no filter. When Glendower says he can teach Hotspur to tame the devil, Hotspur retorts,

And I teach thee, coz, to shame the devil

By telling truth. Tell truth and shame the devil.

If thou have power to raise him, bring him hither,

And I'll be sworn I have power to shame him. (III. i. 60-63)

Hotspur's inability to contain his annoyance when Glendower speaks nonsense about having magical powers illustrates that he cannot contain himself. It is not a good sign for the rebellion. Hotspur is dragged along by Worcester and Northum-

berland. He acts on his feelings without stepping back and assessing the situation. Furthermore, by invoking the devil, he contrasts himself with King Henry, who has invoked Christ. While Henry wants Christ's favor, Hotspur wants to shame the devil. Therefore, it can be said that they come to the same conclusion, but they take different paths to get there. Eventually, he is the only one of the rebellion to keep going, solely for personal vendettas, not legitimate claims. Also, by using truth, he puts himself above Glendower. He is right and Glendower is wrong. Lacking humility, Hotspur continues to act against his own interests.

He is even further doomed when his uncle, Worcester, lies to him before the battle, saying that King Henry has not offered a potential for peace when he has. This is after his father, Northumberland, decides not to show up with his troops, saying he was sick. It also reveals Northumberland's distrust in Hotspur. Henry lets Hal control his army, but Northumberland will not let Hotspur control his. Hotspur's lack of an honest relationship with his father leads him to his downfall. Finally, Hotspur, knowing he is doomed, decides to go out in a blaze of glory. He has the ability to make decisions that King Henry sometimes lacks, but he does not have the ability to process all the options that King Henry and Hal do have. Even though the rebellion is fragile and doomed from the onset, Hotspur doggedly continues.

In this situation, it can be said that Hotspur is good because he is following his role, fighting for his family's honor. He believes himself to be on the side of virtue, and that Mortimer is the rightful king, not Henry. He believes that

he chooses the right course by restoring Richard's line to the throne, restoring the Great Chain of Being. If Henry was unjust in killing Richard, then Hotspur can be viewed as the tragic hero of the play. In the Renaissance, killing a king meant that one was killing God. Hotspur's perspective is that Henry destabilizes the world and plunges it into chaos by deposing Richard. To Hotspur, usurping Henry would restore order to the realm. Therefore, when Hotspur is killed by Hal, his death can be viewed as tragic because Hotspur is practically led to the slaughterhouse by his uncle and father. He is not a planner; he is an actor. He is a child, rushing into battle because he believes he is doing the right thing. Fate is against him, but he still will fight.

On the other hand, Hotspur is not what he appears to be. Despite being seen initially as the epitome of valor and honor, he is sneaky and conniving. When Henry refuses to ransom Mortimer, Hotspur does not give the king the prisoners he captured. Once again, Hotspur blurts out insults without considering the truth. After the king leaves, he lashes out against him with a flurry of insults,

All studies here I solemnly defy,
Save how to gall and pinch this Bolingbroke,
And that same sword-and-buckler Prince of Wales –
But that I think his father loves him not
And would be glad of some mischance –
I would have him poisoned with a pot of ale (I. iii. 236-241)

This reinforces Hotspur's role in the play as a tragic figure. He is choleric; he uses hot-tempered language, but he does not fully know the implications of his words. He is drawn to the rebellion by Northumberland and Worcester. He does not know when to stop. He is so vain that he assumes that Henry does not love Hal. When he says "defy," he juxtaposes himself as an agent of decentralization. His desire is to get rid of Henry. Van Doren states, "For Hotspur was very serious. He was almost, indeed, insanely serious. He did not know that he was amusing. He did not understand himself — could not have named his virtues, would never have admitted his limitations" (Van Doren 107). Hotspur is sneaky, rebellious, and a liar. The plan for the rebellion is to split England into three separate realms, but Hotspur is not going to honor it, showing that he is not fit to be king due to this fraudulent plotting. Hotspur's true nature is something that is hard to grasp. Despite being able to speak beautifully, he does not understand the consequences of his words, or what they mean, or what is going on. Like a child, he is swept up in this world of delusion and trickery, making the appealing first glance of him look like a mistake.

Hotspur dies mid-sentence, which is rather unusual in Shakespeare's works. Usually, a character has a long dramatic monologue before death, but Hotspur dies ignominiously. With his last breath, he utters,

But thoughts, the slaves of life, and life, time's fool,
And time, that takes survey of all the world,

Must have a stop. O, I could prophesy,
But that the earthy and cold hand of death
Lies on my tongue. No, Percy, thou art dust,
And food for – (V. iv. 83-88)

With his last words, he bemoans his fate, and calls himself time's fool. In contrast to all his supposed glory, he is a pawn in the world. His fate is tied to Hal's. Instead of restoring Richard's line to the throne, he becomes dispatched as a mere roadblock to Hal's rise to power. Death "lies on his tongue." More important than Hotspur's actual death is the death of his words. He has become a slave to his own ambitions, a slave to the manipulations of others, and a slave to the cruel hand of fate. His truth has been snuffed out. Since he has died, the glory goes with him. Defeat turns his cause to dust.

Falstaff is the hardest character in the play to pin down. He has no clear motive as Hal, Henry, or Hotspur do. In his case, he seems to be in scenes for his own enjoyment. He is a man of enormous stature, both in terms of size and language. The truth seems to be an afterthought to him. As a result, the language Falstaff uses is manipulative and deceitful. Whether it is for his personal gain or joyful fun, Falstaff will lie his way to the truth. The truth to him is boring, mundane. He finds excitement in tricking others with his supposed truthfulness.

While Falstaff is a clown figure in *1 Henry IV*, he plays an important role because of his profound statements. He offers insight that one might overlook if

he were not involved. One striking example of his dexterity with language is the “counterfeit” dialogue. Although he uses words to justify his cowardice about feigning death against Douglas, he says something profound about life. He says, “Counterfeit? I lie. I am no counterfeit. To die is to be a counterfeit, for he is but a counterfeit of a man who hath not the life of a man; but to counterfeit dying when a man thereby liveth is to be no counterfeit, but the true and perfect image of life indeed” (V. iv. 117-122). Being dead is counterfeiting life and counterfeiting death is being alive. Therefore, he justifies his actions as the right ones because choosing to die would be to fake life: to create the image of a living thing, lacking life itself. With that logic, faking being dead is living; it is a double negative that cancels itself out. He argues that the living know when to call it quits. He says, “The better part of valor is discretion” (V. iv. 122). The bravest know when not to go to war. This is tied to Hotspur, who knew he was doomed, but continued to fight. Therefore, Falstaff claims too that Hotspur is a counterfeit; he chose to fight. Now he is dead and his body fakes being alive. Furthermore, he argues that since he “rose from the dead;” Hotspur could be a counterfeit as well. Proceeding to stab Hotspur’s body and claiming that he was the actual killer of Hotspur, he uses words to twist the reality of life.

Another instance of his misuse of the truth is when Falstaff tries to wiggle out of his feud with the inn hostess. When Hal criticizes him for his scandalous actions, Falstaff defends himself by claiming that all men came from Adam and uses the

concept of original sin. He says, “Thou seest I have more flesh than another man and therefore more frailty” (III. iii. 176-178). Therefore, because Falstaff is so heavy set, there is more sin inside him. He is not responsible for his actions. But on a higher level, he makes a comment on the human condition. We all have the potential to go down the wrong path, and we are all susceptible to evil. He even points out that people do not take responsibility for their actions when they produce bad consequences, which he frequently does. Faced with a rising Hal, Falstaff reminds Hal that he has to earn his inheritance; he has to become the rightful heir in character as well.

When faced with a difficult situation, Falstaff will use his knowledge of language to slip out of trouble. Van Doren, a poet and literary critic, notes that, “Falstaff understands everything and so is never serious” (107). Since his understanding of the world and the people around him is so acute, he has become, in a way, an intelligent clown. The rules and order of the world do not apply to his wit. He makes his own rules. When he is tricked by Hal and Poins, he makes up a story of being in a heroic fight. When Hal calls him out on this, saying that it was him in disguise, Falstaff replies, “Why thou knowest I am as valiant as Hercules, but beware instinct. The lion will not touch the true prince. Instinct is a great matter. I was now a coward on instinct” (II. iv. 281-284). This is significant because Falstaff attempts to sneak out of trouble when Hal accuses him of cowardice. After Falstaff robs the travelers, he in turn is robbed by Hal and Poins in disguise. He runs

away, but later announces to his comrades that he lost the money in a daring fight. Hal calls him out on this, but Falstaff avoids embarrassment by saying he knew it was Hal all along, being a coward on “instinct.” Since he claims to know it was Hal, he had no choice but to run away. He compares himself to a lion, a symbol of bravery and England, “Falstaff, who prefers to avoid risk, remains socially slippery” (Greenfield 144). He will use his mastery of language to talk his way out of unfortunate situations. However, Falstaff’s descent is caused by his inability to rise above his “instinct.” Eventually, he becomes unable to talk his way out of situations.

When Falstaff and Hal finish this dispute, they begin acting out a situation between King Henry and Hal, preparing for Hal’s audience with the king. They each take turns playing Hal and the King. Falstaff tells Hal, “Banish Plump Jack, and Banish all the world” (II. iv. 497-498). In a sense, Falstaff is the world; he takes up the stage, twisting reality and the importance of the situation. This importance threatens to envelop the play. Falstaff’s character directs the audience: “We know him in his – which are never to the point, for they glance off his center and lead us away along tangents of laughter. His enormous bulk spreads though *Henry IV* until it threatens to leave no room for other men and other deeds. But his mind is still larger. It is at home everywhere, and it is never darkened with self-thought” (Van Doren 107). Falstaff is a character who lacks self reflection; he has no doubt. He is a large personality, but there is no single personality. He is a collection of roles he plays. He simply dominates the stage, relishing performance.

Yet there is no truth with Falstaff: “His indifference to truth puts no check upon his invention, and the more improbable and unexpected his contrivances are, the more happily does he seem to be delivered of them, the anticipation of their effect acting as a stimulus to the gaiety of his fancy” (Hazlitt 279). He is a character who loves to exaggerate. His ridiculous antics are meant to elicit reactions. He is a comedian who gets a lot of laughs, from both himself and his audience. The schemes Falstaff concocts work on a stimulus and response loop, as he thrives on the reactions of people. It spurs him to even more demented actions. Falstaff is a giant in terms of comedy, but in terms of telling the truth, he is lacking.

When Hal puts Falstaff in charge of selecting troops, Falstaff uses the position for his own gain, accepting bribes from wealthy men who seek to avoid being conscripted into the military. He tells the audience in a soliloquy,

If I be ashamed of my soldiers, I am a
Soused gurnet. I have misused the King’s press
Damnably. I have got, in exchange of a hundred
and fifty soldiers, three hundred and odd pounds. (IV.ii.11-14)

Abusing Hal’s trust in him, Falstaff fills the ranks with men of disreputable character. He justifies this action by saying that they are as well-equipped as any other men. In his mind, they are there to fight and die, their character and experience mean little to him. If he could profit from the crown’s war, then he should.

Falstaff exits the play the same way he comes in, stealing from others. He takes

credit for killing Hotspur, which Hal in actuality does. He tells Hal, “If the man were alive and would deny it, zounds, I would make him eat a piece of my sword” (V. v. 155-157). Comically, Falstaff is using sword instead of word. This variation is ridiculous, as is his claim. Humorously, Hal backs him up, “This is the strangest fellow, brother John. – Come bring your luggage nobly on your back. For my part, if a lie may do thee grace, I’ll gild it with the happiest terms I have” (V. v. 159-162). He is willing to play a role in this charade. Since the lie gives Falstaff grace, it works in his best interest. Despite being a master of manipulation, he plays in Hal’s world. His existence is contingent on Hal’s favor. Falstaff closes by saying, “I’ll follow, as they say, for reward. He that rewards me, God reward him. If I do grow great, I’ll grow less, for I’ll plunge and leave sack and live cleanly as a nobleman should do” (V. v. 166-169). He lies, but he predicts, eerily accurately, what will happen. He follows Hal for a supposed reward. He says that Hal will be rewarded by God, with the kingship, if Hal rewards him. The irony of him saying ‘If I do great, I’ll grow less’ is striking. His claim of killing Hotspur should make his fame will grow, but it doesn’t. He will continue to live as a thief, as a nobleman would in his own eyes. His goal is to plunder what Henry, Hal, and Hotspur all want to have, but hide it under the guise of “Honor.”

Similarly, Hal is an enigma to the others around him. To Henry, he is a disappointment. To Falstaff, he is the son he never had. Despite this, Hal is able to circumvent others and keep them guessing about his true motives. He has mastered

both high and low language. Because he learns the lessons of truth from Henry, Falstaff, and Hotspur, he absorbs knowledge from all of those figures and uses it to further his position. In the beginning of the play, he converses with low characters to the chagrin of his father. Even though he is at this low point, he makes an announcement of his future trajectory,

Yet Herein will I imitate the sun
Who doth permit the base contagious clouds
To smother up his beauty from the worlds,
That, when he please again to be himself,
Being wanted, he may be more wondered at
By breaking through the foul and ugly mists
Of vapors that did seem to strangle him (I. ii. 204-209)

Hal explains to the audience how he hides his righteous attributes. Like the bright gleam of the sun, Hal hides behind the clouds on an overcast day. This shows that Hal is fit to be king. Even though he associates with low characters, he never falls to their level. He knows his role is to become king, and he will not remain with low characters such as Falstaff forever. The low characters are the “foul and ugly mists” that he will break through. He shields his true intent in order to hide from the ignominious nature of his father’s rule. Because he is the least likely to become the heir due to his outlandish behavior, he is able to avoid attention during a time when Henry IV’s legitimacy is questioned: “Actually hiding his true motives so that

he himself will not be played by anyone and will remain at the top of the monarchist food chain” (Dunn 94). Hal is concealing himself, acting as the controller and not a pawn. This will allow him to quietly claim awe and attention, appearing as the hero at the last minute. Unlike Hotspur, he has no desire to inject himself immediately into the situation. He will bide his time and wait for the right moment to pounce. Hal’s “true” nature is revealed through his use of language and the personality shift caused by Henry’s need for his assistance and his own need to prove himself.

Falstaff hopes that Hal will become king and that Hal, as king, will pardon him. He imagines that Hal’s realm will be different than Henry’s, where thievery is not tolerated. When Falstaff claims that Hal will not act against him as king, but in response to Falstaff’s imploring Hal not to banish him, Hal says succinctly, “I do, I will” (II. iv. 499). Even though Hal speaks only four words, they show that he has what it takes to be king. He will take action confidently and not waffle. That is the nature of a true king. The real Hal begins to shine through.

Even though Hal intends to restore order to the line, he himself is not the purest man. In some ways, he is as manipulative as Hotspur: “Prince Hal, in fact, who adopts the conventional comedic devices of disguise, eavesdropping, badinage and trickery” (Greenfield 147). By learning under the tutelage of Falstaff, Hal figures out how to rule effectively over the domain. Since immersing himself with the low characters provides a means to control them, it is a worthwhile course. In

contrast to the perception of others, Hal is never too far from the throne, even when interacting with low characters. He never completely crosses the line into the world of low characters. He is aware of his role, perhaps more than others because he learns how to appear truthful to commoners using their language. He tells his father when reconciling,

So please your majesty, I would I could

Quit all offenses with as clear excuse

As well as I am doubtless I can purge

Myself of many I am charged withal.

Yet such extenuation let me beg

As, in reproof of many tales devised (III. i. 20-25)

Hal knows he has upset his father; he does not need to explain himself to the king. Unlike Falstaff, he accepts responsibility for his actions. His strength comes from his ability to hold information and wait for the right moment. Since he understands language well, he does not have to say much to the king. Speaking to the king requires reverence even if it is his own father. He does not excuse himself; he is succinct, using short statements: “I am doubtless I can purge.” Assuming the role of a ruler provides for his future success, with Henry eventually trusting him enough to lead his army into battle.

Hal is both the noble king and the delinquent troublemaker. He is a balance between the high-flying Hotspur and belly-crawling Falstaff. Although Hal may

not be a competent ruler in the future, Henry trusts him enough, and needs him even more, to give him an opportunity to prove himself. He grows throughout the play, rising toward the kingship. He starts with a base nature, but slowly reveals more of himself as the play advances. Although he lets Falstaff take credit for the death of Hotspur, Hal still is the ultimate victor. He proves that he is able to be the king. The lessons Hal has learned will come to benefit him in *Henry V*, where he wins a war with his language. His truth is defined by him.

With these characters the truth can be difficult to discern. Henry IV is not the most honorable man, nor is Hal or Hotspur. They all profess to have some sort of code, but these codes seem to be subject to change depending upon the situation. Their codes influence the way they use language. Conversely, Falstaff, who professes to have no honor and only hedonistic goals, is also amorphous, but for Falstaff there are no boundaries. Henry attempts to rid himself of the stain of the past, Richard's end; Hal attempts to conceal his present ambitions; and Hotspur attempts to end the Bolingbroke line. Each one has his own sense of what truth is, but each has an issue with it. Henry must prove that he is a just king; Hal must prove that he is a noble heir; Hotspur must prove that Mortimer is the rightful heir. As a result, Henry's flaws become apparent, Hal rises to the occasion, and Hotspur crashes and burns in a blaze of foolishness. With Falstaff, the only truth is mocking those who pretend to be truthful. He has no need for the truth, yet when he is in a world of truth, he eventually will have to play by the rules or face the consequences. Despite

being dashing and clever tongued at first glance, Hotspur is malicious and temperamental upon further inspection. His inability to prevent a loosely held alliance from fracturing dooms him. He has insulted and dampened the confidence of his allies. His deceit lies with his image and his language. Although he possesses status and the ability to use language, he lacks the ability to harness these qualities to his benefit. Hal, in contrast, has both of those qualities, but he hides them from view. Henry IV's reign comes under question, and his authenticity and character as well. Consequently, the truth is tangled in a web of lies, with a spider gleefully spinning more thread to confound.

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Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz and Proto-feminism in the 17th Century

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The 17th century saw a generation of women writers start to question the female role in society and, more specifically, the discourse revolving around women's education, and their desire to have a literary role. Aphra Behn, for instance, distinguished herself as the first woman to earn a living as a professional writer, which was revolutionary for her time. Margaret Cavendish, another female writer from the 17th century, was the first female author to publish under her own name. Among the pioneering women writers in Spanish is Sor Juana, a Hieronymite nun from the New Spain, self-taught scholar, philosopher, philologist and writer of the Latin American colonial period, and of the Hispanic Baroque, who was dubbed the "Tenth Muse." Her most famous work, the letter-essay entitled "Respuesta de la Poetisa a la Muy Ilustre Sor Filotea de la Cruz," ("Reply from the Poetess to the Very Illustrious Sister Philotea de la Cruz"), and the poem "Hombres Necios," ("Silly Men"), reveal her progressive and proto-feminist concerns.

Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz can be regarded as the first feminist of the New World and, consequently, many scholars of literature have attempted to engage in feminist readings of her works. According to Pamela Kirk, the author of *Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz: Religion, Art, and Feminism*, those readings have revealed the nun's commitment to defying the roles of women within society (13). One of the most

celebrated scholars, who, in fact, wrote an entire book on Sor Juana's body of work, is the Nobel Prize recipient and prolific Mexican writer, Octavio Paz. Paz, in his book entitled *Sor Juana*, notes that of the major poets of the Western world, a number of them are women poets such as Emily Dickinson, Gabriela Mistral, Elizabeth Bishop, and of course, the Tenth Muse (1). Additionally, he points out that all of the aforementioned writers share similarities that go beyond their biological sex: they all remained unmarried, and lived at the edge of their respective societies. Sor Juana, however, is an exceptional case. Paz also mentions that among the things that set her apart is the fact that she was a nun, that she was an illegitimate child singled out for her exceptional beauty, and that she was also very poor. The author of *Sor Juana* dedicates a great part of his book to discussing one of her most famous pieces, "Respuesta de la Poetisa a la Muy Ilustre Sor Filotea de la Cruz," which is also the last thing that Sor Juana wrote, a letter addressed to the bishop of Puebla, a city in central Mexico, that contains several elements of what could be called proto-feminist philosophy.

It is important to establish the context in which the letter was written in order to understand the root of the discussion, and the significance of her response. Paz, in an article for *The Los Angeles Times* titled "The Passionate Rebellion of Sor Juana Inez de la Cruz" [*sic*], that served as an adaptation of his book *Sor Juana*, explains that in 1690 the Bishop of Puebla, Manuel Fernández de Santa Cruz, published Sor Juana's criticism and refutation of a famous sermon by the Jesuit Manuel Antonio

Rojo del Río y Vieyra (“The Passionate Rebellion”). This criticism, which would be her only theological piece, was written at some friend’s request, and “with more repugnance than any other feeling, as much because it treats sacred things, for which I have reverent terror, as because it seems to wish to impugn, for which I have a natural aversion” (qtd. in Paz, “The Passionate Rebellion”). Paz further explains that it was particularly uncommon for a woman, who was a nun *and* Mexican, to even question the authority of a male figure, especially someone as celebrated as Vieyra, who was also the Portuguese confessor of Christina of Sweden (“The Passionate Rebellion”). Not only are Sor Juana’s words defiant, but they are also proof that she believed that she possessed the intellectual capacity and authority to refute Vieyra’s message. The bishop, without her consent, published this first document by Sor Juana and responded with a letter, which he called “Carta Atenagorica, the “Letter Worthy of Athena” (“The Passionate Rebellion”).

According to Sharon Larisch, a writer for a *The Philology Journal* whose work is titled “Sor Juana’s ‘Apologia,’” the motives surrounding the publication of this private letter are ambiguous (49). Octavio Paz has put forward the idea that the bishop of Puebla, Manuel Fernández de Santa Cruz, intended to attack his rival, Francisco Aguiar y Seijas, the Jesuit bishop of Mexico City, by criticizing a member— Sor Juana—of said order (qtd. in Larisch 49). However, Larisch explains that, although the reasons behind it are unclear, Sor Filotea de la Cruz’s preface to Sor Juana’s initial letter seems to indicate that her response should be targeted at the

publication of her work (49). That is to say, the nun was expected to challenge the publication itself, rather than defend her position in relation to Bishop Manuel Antonio Rojo del Río y Vieyra's ideas. In response to Sor Juana's "Carta Atenagórica," as explained by Paz, the bishop of Puebla, under the pseudonym of Sor Filotea de la Cruz, expressed his disapproval in his missive, but the subject matter, which was supposed to be of a theological nature, turned out to be more about his reprobation of her intellectual and literary endeavors ("The Passionate Rebellion"). Sor Filotea claims, "I do not intend that you change your nature by renouncing books, but better it by reading that of Jesus Christ... It is a pity that so great an understanding lower itself in such a way by unworthy notice of the Earth that is have no desire to penetrate what transpires in Heaven and, since it be already lowered to the ground, that is not descend farther, to consider what transpires in Hell" (qtd. in Paz, "The Passionate Rebellion"). Here, the bishop not only recommends that she should focus more on the word of Jesus Christ, but also plainly dismisses her for engaging with secular literature. Additionally, there is a certain undertone that suggests Sor Filotea is, in fact, questioning Sor Juana's devotion and life purpose, because of her desire for knowledge. Actually, the bishop can be quoted as reminding Sor Juana of St. Paul's command, which states that, "The women should keep silence in the churches. For they are not permitted to speak, but should be subordinate, even as the law says" (I. Cor. 14:33). Given the circumstances and setting that the bishop of Puebla provided, Sor Juana's response had to be, simultaneously, "a dis-

course of defense and a defense of discourse” (Larisch 49). In other words, the theological nature of the discussion suddenly became secondary and it became more of a discourse surrounding her—and other women’s—rights. What followed was Sor Juana’s famous response “Respuesta de la Poetisa a la Muy Ilustre Sor Filotea de la Cruz,” which served as a defense of her position.

According to Paz’s article, “Respuesta de la Poetisa” is a unique piece of literature, which is often referred to as an “intellectual autobiography,” and a defense of women’s rights to learning. The subsequent readings and criticism of “Respuesta” are in accordance with Paz’s. Such is the case of Michael Schuessler’s overview, “Reply to Sor Philotea,” which suggests that Sor Juana forcefully argued that women had both the right and ability to learn as demonstrated by her own life experience and that of other women (462). In other words, not only did she defend herself and other women, but she also proved that she was more than qualified to support her initial claims. Sor Juana writes in her response that, “Yo no estudio para escribir, ni menos para enseñar, sino sólo por ver si con estudiar ignoro menos” / I do not study in order to write, much less to teach, but just to see if with some knowledge, I can ignore less (de la Cruz, “Respuesta de la Poetisa”). She further explains that since the first time the “light of reason” touched her, she had a strong urge and inclination towards knowledge, and that her love for words was a gift from God. Here, Sor Juana suggests that God knows the reason why He gave her the ability, and she therefore assumes the religious and moral authority to engage

in learning. In addition to this, she tells the story of how she used to cut her hair at a time when most young girls wanted long and pretty locks, an anecdote that reveals her strong desire to learn. She says:

I used to cut four or five fingers' width from mine, keeping track of how far it had formerly reached, and making it my rule that if by the time it grew back to that point, I did not know such-and-such a thing which I had set out to learn as it grew, I could cut it again as a penalty for my dullness... for I did not consider it right that a head so bare of knowledge should be dressed with hair, knowledge being the more desirable ornament. (Qtd. in Schuessler 464-465)

Another interesting claim made by the nun is that God, besides knowing why and for what reason, also knows that she—with no luck—has asked Him to leave only enough intellect for her to understand his Law. She asserts, “lo demás sobra, según algunos, en una mujer; y aún hay quien diga que daña” / the rest is irrelevant, according to some, in a woman; and still some say it is harmful (de la Cruz, “Respuesta de la Poetisa”). It seems that Sor Juana is subtly challenging and rebelling against the idea that knowledge in a woman is useless. Furthermore, Sor Juana remembers St. Paul's words quoted by the bishop, and, instead of defending her right to speak publicly about religious matters, she defends her secular interests (Larisch 50). Not only does she defend her right to knowledge, but she also claims a kind of linguistic and intellectual authority. In response to St. Paul's words, she

says: “pues vemos que, con efecto, no se permite en la Iglesia que las mujeres lean públicamente ni prediquen. ¿Por qué reprenden a las que privadamente estudian?” / ... we see that, in fact, it is prohibited in the Church for a woman to read publicly or preach. Why, then, do they punish the ones who study privately? (de la Cruz, “Respuesta de la Poetisa”). Significantly, she uses, in support of her defense, the same passage that the bishop tried to use against her initially, which not only demonstrates the nun’s complete understanding of Scripture, but also an indisputable mastery of rhetoric.

Later in her response she relates that she became religious because she did not entertain the idea of marriage and that she wanted to live by herself (de la Cruz, “Respuesta de la Poetisa”). She further claims that she did not want to have any other occupation that would interfere with her studies, nor did she want the gossip of a community that would prevent the silence of her books (de la Cruz, “Respuesta de la Poetisa”). While some may say that the fact that she ended up in a convent, subjected to a male-run religious institution, contradicts the claims of feminism, it is worth remembering the time and place in which she lived. Not only was she very poor and an illegitimate child, but becoming a nun was the only viable and respectable option for a woman who did not want to be married. Sor Juana also defends her right to secular knowledge, explaining that, since knowledge facilitates a better understanding of theology, it is beneficial to “go up the stairs of the sciences and humanities” (“Respuesta de la Poetisa”).

What follows that particular statement is a portion in “Respuesta” that consists entirely of questions. One of the many questions she poses is how she should comprehend the general and particular methods in which the Holy Scripture is written without knowing Logic, and how she could recognize its figures of speech and tropes without first learning Rhetoric. (“Respuesta”). In to “Reply to Sor Philotea,” she cites several examples and references Catholic saints, such as St. Augustine and St. Jerome, the patron saint of her order, who “found their way to Heaven precisely through the concerted study of the mysteries of life on Earth” (Schuessler 463). Additionally, Schuessler comments that St. Jerome himself was a literary scholar, and that, ironically, he also fought in favor of secular knowledge and literature (463).

Furthermore, to support her response and defense, Sor Juana also provides examples of extraordinary women in history, both in the secular and the religious world, something that Margaret Fuller would do in her book *Woman in the Nineteenth Century* two hundred years later. While she explains her understanding of what St. Paul meant, she also questions whether the bishop’s interpretation about denying women the right to write or study, would have been true. If so, why did the Church permit “a Gertrude, a Teresa, a Bridget, the nun of Agreda, and many more to study?” (*A Sor Juana Anthology* 236). She also adds that the counterargument stating that they were all saints is irrelevant because St. Paul’s proposition seems absolute and, in theory, takes into account all women (“Respuesta”). As additional proof that other educated women strived outside of the domestic sphere,

Schuessler points out that Sor Juana provides examples of those who played important roles in biblical history: Deborah, who created military and political laws; the Queen of Sheba, who challenged the wisest and became “judge of non-believers;” Abigail, who possessed the gift of prophecy; and Esther, who was “blessed with a supreme persuasiveness,” among others (465). Sor Juana’s compendium of influential women does not end there; she also references the “Gentiles” and she presents the fact that women, like Athena, and later Minerva, were worshiped as goddesses of wisdom (227). The list continues as she recognizes women outside of the religious canon, and she says:

I see a Polla Argentaria helping her husband Lucan write the Pharsalian Battle. I see divine Tiresias’ daughter, more learned than her father. I see a Zenobia, queen of the Palmyrans, as wise as she is brave. An Arete, daughter of Aristippus, learned in the extreme. A Nicostrata, inventor of Latin letters and extremely erudite in the Greek. An Aspasia of Miletus, teacher of philosophy and rhetoric and instructress of the philosopher Pericles. A Hypatia, who taught astrology and lectured for a long time in Alexandria. A Leoncia, the Greek woman who wrote in opposition to Theophrastus, the philosopher, and won him over. A Jucia, a Corinna, a Cornelia. (de la Cruz, *Sor Juana* 227-228)

Moreover, she also mentions Catherine of Egypt, St. Gertrude, Queen Isabella, the wife of Alfonso X, and to her contemporary, the great Christina of Sweden, who,

she claims, is “as learned as she is courageous and great-hearted” (229). Besides supporting her argument that greatness comes from learned women, Sor Juana demonstrates how well-read, educated and informed she was. At the same time, she champions the existence of those accomplished women by pointing out their strengths and accomplishments. After proving that education and knowledge had been beneficial for those women, Sor Juana argues that much harm could be avoided if older women were also learned (232). What Sor Juana means by this is that older women could educate the younger generations and pass down their knowledge, much as they did with their knowledge of weaving and other typically female activities. Furthermore, she claims that, with no female educators, men would have to be in the position of providing education for their daughters and, since they would likely refuse—perhaps for lack of time and interest on their part—many women who want to pursue knowledge would be left with nothing except their domesticated lives (233).

Finally, Schuessler in his overview adds that, towards the end of the response, Sor Juana returns to the infamous “Carta Atenagorica” to challenge Sor Filotea (i.e. the bishop) to answer a series of questions:

If the crime is the “Athenagoric Letter,” was there anything more to that than simply setting forth my views without exceeding the limits our Holy Mother Church allows? If she with her most holy authority does not forbid my doing so, why should others forbid it? Was holding an opinion

contrary to Vieyra an act of boldness on my part, and not [his] holding one opposing the three holy Church Fathers [Augustine, Thomas, Aquinas, and John Chrysostom]? Is not my mind, such as it is, as free as his, considering their common origin? Is his opinion one of the revealed precepts of Holy Faith, that we should have to believe it blindly? (Qtd. in Schuessler)

In the first question, Sor Juana essentially claims that her initial critique of Vieyra's sermon should not appear inappropriate, since she was simply attempting to express her own viewpoint without abusing the authorities of the Holy Mother Church. Then, if the Holy Mother Church did not prohibit her from doing so, why should others do it? She also clarifies that she was simply expressing an opinion contrary to that of Vieyra's—not a saint, but a man—and that she did not actually question the authority of any of the three Holy Church Fathers. In the last two questions, Sor Juana defiantly puts herself on Vieyra's level by reaffirming that her mind is as free as his because they both have the same capacity and nature, and she essentially suggests that his opinion is not something sacred, something to be believed in blindly. To further emphasize her claims and the importance they had, it is worth mentioning that she publicly claimed that a man was her equal, and, therefore, had the same intellectual capacity. This statement concludes her defense of her right, and every woman's right, to education and knowledge.

Another celebrated work by Sor Juana entitled "Hombres Necios ("Silly Men") is a *redondill*, consisting of seventeen stanzas, which represents a harsh critique

against men's double standards when it comes to judging and categorizing women. The poem, in the form of a satire, is one of her most frequently mentioned works, and is often cited when she is discussed as a feminist. Furthermore, although the term was coined in the 20th century, "Hombres Necios" also points out, line by line, the illogic of the Madonna-Whore Complex, i.e., the idea that men see women as either virtuous and benevolent Madonnas (virgins) or whores. Indeed, the first stanza in the poem already seems like a feminist manifesto:

Hombres necios que acusáis a la mujer sin razón, sin ver que sois la ocasion de lomismo que culpáis.	Silly, you men—so very adept at wrongly faulting womankind, not seeing you're alone to blame for faults you plant in woman's mind. (110-111)
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Here, Sor Juana's criticism of men mirrors the way men have criticized women for centuries, and she blames men for creating a disharmonious environment between the sexes. Additionally, by saying they are to blame for faults they plant in a woman's mind, Sor Juana may also be referring not only to the individual male, but also to the patriarchal system as a whole. She continues:

Si con ansia sin igual solicitáis su desdén, ¿por qué queréis que obren bien si las incitáis al mal? Combatís su resistencia y luego, con gravedad, decís que fue liviandad lo que hizo la diligencia.	After you've won by urgent plea the right to tarnish her good name, you still expect her to behave— <i>you</i> , that coaxed her into shame. You batter her resistance down and then, all righteousness, proclaim that feminine frivolity, not your persistence, is to blame. (110-111)
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In this passage, quite similar to the first stanza, she directly questions men's role by

claiming that it is foolish to expect women to remain blindly obedient after they—without supposedly knowing—have humiliated and incited them to behave the way they do. Furthermore, Sor Juana starts to hint at the hypocrisy of their judgment: even though men have historically subordinated and suppressed women, they seem to claim that female nature is the cause of their unhappiness. More of what she perceives to be a hypocritical double standard can be found in the following:

Queréis, con presunción
necia, hallar a la que buscáis,
para pretendida, Thais,
y en la posesión, Lucrecia.

Presumptuous beyond belief,
you'd have the woman you pursue
be Thais when you're courting
her, Lucretia once she falls to
you. (110-111)

Here Sor Juana suggests that, besides believing arrogantly that they can have any woman they desire, men expect a certain kind of woman when pursuing her, but want another kind of woman once they “have” her. First, they want someone who resembles Thais, a famous Greek *hetaira* (“elevated prostitute”) but after they are victorious in courting her, they expect a loyal—almost to a fault—type of Lucretia.

Additionally, she comments,

Con el favor y el desdén tenéis
condición igual, quejándoos, si
os tratan mal, burlándoos, si os
quieren bien.

Whether you're favored or disdained,
nothing can leave you satisfied.
You whimper if you're turned away,
you sneer if you've been gratified. (110-111)

In other words, not only are men never pleased, but they operate between two opposites: they either complain if the woman treats them badly, or they mock and perceive her as weak if she cares for him. This supports the statement, as recognized by her, that men hold women to a virgin-whore dichotomy. Sor Juana adds:

Opinión, ninguna gana; pues
la que más se recata, si no os
admite, es ingrata, y si os
admite, es liviana. Siempre
tan necios andáis que, con
desigual nivel, a una culpáis
por cruel y a otra por fácil culpáis.

With you, no woman can hope to
score; whichever way, she's bound
to lose; spurning you, she's un-
grateful; succumbing you, you call
her lewd. Your folly is always the
same: you apply a single rule to
the one you accuse of looseness
and the one you brand as cruel.
(112-113)

In addition to this, Sor Juana also questions if their impossible standards will ever be satisfied; they always seem to follow a pattern. In the later stanzas, she challenges men by stating that they should not be so stunned at the fact that they are to blame for this type of female behavior. However, she offers a solution: “Querredlas cual las hacéis o hacedlas cual las buscáis” / Either like them for what you’ve made them or make of them what you can like (112-113). In other words, if men are unhappy with the product they have themselves created they should remake women in a way that they can themselves like. This statement seems to be directed towards the patriarchy as well, expressing that the result of the patriarchal system is neither beneficial for women nor for men. What is interesting about this fragment is that the tone, besides being accusatory, suggests there is a possible solution. Figuratively, if women’s undesirable behaviors are molded by a system in which men hold the power and where women are excluded, what needs to change is the system itself and not so much the women or men in an individual sense.

Paz in his book adds that Sor Juana’s defense of her sex in “Hombres Necios” is not purely intellectual because it is grounded in the morality and belief system of the era as

well as in common sense (304). Additionally, in his interpretation he notes that one of the other themes in the poem has to do with “erotic relationships outside matrimony,” which Sor Juana claims are sinful; however, Sor Juana questions the necessity of solely blaming women (Paz 304). She raises a moral question:

In other words, she poses the question of who is ridden with more guilt: the woman

¿O cuál es más de culpar, aunque cualquiera mal haga: la que peca por la paga o el que paga por pecar?	Or which is more to be blamed—though both will have cause for chagrin: the woman who sins for money or the man who pays money to sin? (112-113)
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who seduces the man, or the man who had the initiative? Sor Juana does not disagree with the fact that extramarital relationships are sinful; instead, she suggests that it is hypocritical not to blame both the man and the woman in an equal manner.

Paz also comments that, although the themes dealt with in “Hombres Necios” are not necessarily groundbreaking, the great novelty is that a woman—and not a man—was the author of that satirical *redondilla* (304). Likewise, Paz asserts that the poem was an “historical watershed” because, for the first time in Novohispanic literature, a woman spoke in her own name, defending herself and her sex with elegance and intelligence, and using “the same weapons as the detractors of her sex, accusing them of the very vices they impute to women” (304). The nun, then, was ahead of her time. The author of *Sor Juana* also claims that there is nothing similar in literature written by the contemporary French, Italian, or English women writers, and that the fact that she wrote her satirical poem in New Spain, a rigid

society under the two powers of the Catholic Church and the Spanish monarchy, is worthy of praise and admiration (Paz 304).

Overall, Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz can be understood as significant not only because she was a prolific writer and contributor to both Spanish and Mexican literature, but also because she was one of the firsts, if not the first, American women to display an early feminist sentiment in her works. “Respuesta de la Poetisa a la Muy Ilustre Sor Filotea de la Cruz” is an extraordinary example of a woman advocating for female rights concerning education, and secular knowledge. “Respuesta” is also a peculiar piece worthy of scholarly study and interpretation because in it she mixes autobiographical information with her defense, and a manifesto. However, this mixture of genres is not gratuitous; everything serves the purpose of her response. Another interesting feature is that she enumerates outstanding women who were able to achieve greatness because of their intellectual curiosity and endeavors. This female championing seems to express gratitude, and to prove with irrefutable facts that education for the female sex has not been, historically, something to lament. Additionally, this work’s detailed composition displays the nun’s mastery of language and rhetoric as well as her exceptional intellectual capacity in a pre-Enlightenment era. Larisch suggests that although Sor Juana’s response was published posthumously, it is quite possible that it had some circulation before her death, and that the bishop’s response was silence (52). “Hombres Necios,” which is a more accessible—yet highly clever—piece of literature, displays

the suggested disapproval of the patriarchal system as well as her rejection of the limited roles available to women. Sor Juana represents a strong position against the double standard that, sadly, still permeates modern culture, and she questions the establishment itself. Although her work is praised and studied by many scholars, her importance to feminist history still remains quite obscure. Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz, as controversial as she was, can be understood as the quintessential proto-feminist that voiced her opinions and concerns in an era when most women were expected to remain silent.

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Irish Potato Famine: the Irish versus the English

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The Irish potato famine was a devastation that killed approximately two million people, taking a large toll on the Irish population. Traditionally, the interpretation has been that this destruction was caused by blight, a plant disease that prevented crop growth that spread around Europe. However, if all of the European countries were affected by this agricultural failure, then why was Ireland damaged so much more significantly? In fact, the factors that contributed to this massive loss of life of the Irish people were not simply due to natural occurrence; British economic policy in Ireland played a significant role too. Historians have debated the degree to which British policy may have exacerbated the famine, and whether this involvement could be considered a genocidal act. While some historians' definitions of genocide require intent to destroy a people, others recognize that genocide may develop out of negligence or failure to adapt constructive government policy. I think it can be argued that the Irish Potato Famine can be considered genocide, despite the lack of a definite intent.

During the years 1846-49, each year's potato crop was almost completely ruined by blight. The results of the famine create a rupture in Irish history. There was pestilence, scurvy, and disease in Ireland. The number of agricultural laborers and smallholders in the western and southwestern counties underwent an especially

drastic decline, since many had to sell their land due to lack of monetary support. Other negative effects for the Irish from the devastation include the failure of the 1848 Young Ireland Rebellion, and the decline of the Land League. The “poor rate” rose by 1000% between 1847 and 1851, according to Murphy (“The Graves Are Walking”). Since a large percentage of people died during the famine, the Catholic Church declined in population as well. Although Ireland was known for having a history of agrarian violence, the country was very peaceful, as is evident in the absence of retaliation against Britain’s government policies during the famine (Donnelly). Ireland was definitely not a threat to any nation, especially not to Britain. Just like any other nation in severe trouble, Ireland deserved help, especially since it was a dependent of England at the time. But it was denied aid despite the fact that “Ireland lay at the doorstep of what was then the world’s wealthiest nation” (Donnelly).

William Bennett’s *Narrative of a Recent Journey of Six Weeks in Ireland* (1847) gives insight into the daily life of the Irish during the Irish Potato Famine without placing any blame. He gives the conditions of the homes: “Not distinguishable as human habitations from the surrounding moor... The bare sod was about the best material of which any of them were constructed. Doorways, not doors... windows and chimneys, I think had no existence. A second apartment or division of any kind within was exceedingly rare. Furniture, properly so-called, I believe may be stated at nil... we saw neither bed, chair, nor table, at all. A chest, a few iron or

earthen vessels, a stool or two, the dirty rags and night-coverings, mud and filth surrounding them; the same inside, or worse if possible, from the added closeness, darkness, and smoke.” Bennett’s first-hand account of the Irish homes during the famine shows how the living conditions of the poor worsened to the point of being practically unlivable (Bennett 25-29).

Bennett also gives insight to the conditions of the people:

(...) badly infected with fever, which was sometimes sufficiently perceptible from without, by the almost intolerable stench. The scenes of human misery and degradation we witnessed still haunt my imagination, with the vividness and power of some horrid and tyrannous delusion, rather than the features of sober reality. Three children huddled together, lying there because they were too weak to rise, pale and ghastly, their little limbs—on removing a portion of the filth covering—perfectly emaciated, eye sunk, voice gone, and evidently in the last stage of actual starvation, scarcely human in appearance. (26-27)

The living conditions during this time resulted in many of the Irish people becoming ill, which affected the family structure. Bennett explains how family life devolved into a struggle to survive: “Many were remnants of families, crowded together in one cabin; orphaned little relatives taken in by the equally destitute, and even strangers, for these poor people are kind to one and other to the end. A sister, just dying, was laying by the side of her little brother, just dead. They rarely com-

plained despite hunger” (28).

The destitute living conditions of the Irish people were recognized as far away as the United States through letters sent to the United States and through Americans visiting Ireland. If people as far away as America knew how the Irish people were living, the British certainly knew of the plight of the people there as well. Right Reverend John Hughes, D.D., Bishop of New York, delivered under the General Committee for the Relief of the Suffering Poor of the Ireland “A Lecture on the Antecedent Causes of the Irish Famine in 1847.” America wanted to help Ireland; and, according to Hughes, just sympathizing helped the spirit of Ireland and helped them not to give up. Hughes says: “The bread with which your ships are freighted, will arrive too late for many a suffering child of hers; but the news that is coming, will perchance reach the peasant’s cabin, in the final hour of his mortal agony. It is the smile of hope, as well as of gratitude; hope, not for himself, it will come too late for that, but for his pale wife and famished little ones” (5). The Reverend recounts that the theories attributing blame for the Irish potato famine each have some truth to them. Each cause gives rise to other effects, proliferating like a butterfly effect. Hughes’ official statement is:

Of the attempt, then, be not considered too bold, I shall endeavor to lay before you a brief outline of the primary causes, which by the action and reaction of secondary and intermediate agencies, have produced: the rapacity of landlords, the poverty of the country, the imputed want of industry

among its people, and the causes to which the present calamity will be ascribed by British statesmen. I shall designate these causes by three titles; first, incompleteness of conquest; second, bad government; third, a defective or vicious system of social economy. (5)

Hughes provides examples of perpetrators and causes, but do these examples constitute genocide? In his piece, Hughes shows that the British knew about the poverty levels in the country of Ireland, but he maintained that the Irish needed to be independent and to learn to fend for themselves to become industrialized. Because the British regarded the Irish as lazy, poor farmers, they thought that the Irish would strengthen through the time of famine. Any policy of relief, such as soup kitchens, only lasted for six months, even though Britain was rich enough to make the relief last longer. Clearly, this was more of a choice for England not to protect the Irish who depended on them. The British largely ignored the needs of the starving people because they regarded them as lazy, backward, and inferior to themselves.

An accusation of genocidal effect through negligence means there were many things that England could have done, or policies that could have been altered, that would have prevented the devastation.

First, the government might have prohibited the export of grain from Ireland, especially during the winter of 1846-47 and early in the following spring; when there was little food in the country and before large supplies

of foreign grain began to arrive. Once there was sufficient food in the country, from perhaps the beginning of 1848, the government could have taken steps to ensure that this imported food was distributed to those in the greatest need. (Donnelly)

Second, the British government should have continued to operate the soup kitchens after they closed within six months. In July 1847, at the peak of the soup kitchens, three million people were given food daily. “Third, the wages that the government paid on its vast but short-lived public works in the winter of 1846-47 needed to be much higher if those toiling on the public works were going to be able to afford the greatly inflated price of food” (Donnelly). Fourth, the poor-law system of relief, the program that was the only form of public assistance from the fall of 1847 forward, needed to be less restrictive. If the system was less restrictive, than a lot of food could have been provided to the Irish people. The restrictions came because Britain wanted to shape the Irish into having a stronger sense of self-reliance. Fifth, the British government could have done something to stop all of the evictions that caused 500,000 people to lose their homes from 1846-1854; and could have instead assisted with immigration to North America (Donnelly).

Most importantly, however, there was the Corn Law, which regulated the governing import and export of grain. This law encouraged farming over industry in British dependents, which is why Ireland was a little behind England in industrial development. Irish agricultural production became politically important

during the grain shortage due to Britain's population growth and blockages of imports from the Napoleonic Wars. Peel, then the Prime Minister, suggested at the beginning of the famine that more food should be provided to England. The real problem was that the agrarian country was filled with poor farmers already, so when the blight took away their only food resource, and sole income, the Irish had no spare food for themselves after exporting to England. What really would have helped the Irish was a repeal of the Corn Law and a subsequent decrease in exporting, but England thought only of its own self-interest. England was having its own grain shortage at the time, and needed the grain, meat, and other high-quality food supplied to them by Ireland because Ireland was a part of the British Empire. The British emphasized self-reliance, yet they still took from the Irish during a time of devastation, and did not help them in return.

The Poor Law Amendment Act placed all responsibility to provide for the Irish poor on the landlords and small farmers. The purpose of the act was to make the Irish feel independent and to motivate them. The landlords passed the burden onto their tenants and small farmers, but the already starving farmers couldn't pay. The Gregory Clause did not allow anyone who owned more than a quarter of an acre to receive any type of government support. After this law had been repealed, people were still reluctant to help the Irish, again possibly because of the history of stigma.

Historians of the Irish Potato famine have interpreted those policy decisions

differently, leading historians to disagree about whether the famine should be assigned the status of genocide. In *The Graves Are Walking*, John Kelly offers insight into the Irish Potato Famine, but does not exactly qualify it as genocide, but rather as genocidal effects. His rationale for not using the term genocide is that the English did not intentionally try to kill the Irish by not providing quick relief, but that they instead tried to teach the Irish to build their own economy (Bakshian). The British policymakers wanted the Irish to switch from farming to an urban economy, while Ireland was still under British rule during this time (Chotiner 11). The Irish had to give up farmland for relief from Britain, as a part of the Poor Law Amendment's Gregory Clause. The British may be able to claim that these acts were not intended to eliminate and kill millions of Irish people, so on the basis of intent, claiming genocide may be difficult. In fact, historian Donnelly argues, the "food gap" from the potato famine was so large that it couldn't have been fixed, even if Ireland kept all of their grain instead of exporting it to Britain. Also, Britain looked upon the famine as coming from God to teach the Irish a lesson, so they felt justified in not providing relief (Chotiner 11). As we have seen, there was a lot of propaganda that distorted the perception of the Irish as lazy and inferior people, and led the English to see aiding them as enabling their laziness. Unfortunately, this degradation of the Irish culture and people does not fall under the 1948 UN definition of genocide, because the UN definition, as it currently stands, does not include cultural genocide. Nevertheless, it is clear that the British caused genocidal effects from their handling

of the Irish famine/lack of relief during this atrocity.

In “The Famine Plot,” Tim Pat Coogan argues that the Irish Potato Famine was indeed a genocide based on the 1948 UN Convention definition (Coogan). A source that Coogan uses is the comics degrading the Irish people, and he says that those comics helped develop a view of the Irish as lazy and racially inferior (Politicalworld.org). The propaganda against the Irish may have led to a “learned helplessness,” a condition in which the spirit is so broken that people don’t even want to try to get stronger (Mcintyre). This mindset resulted in delayed marriages and mental illnesses. According to Coogan, the cultivation of such a mindset can be considered mental harm, a part of 1948 UN Convention’s definition. A third historian, McIntyre, adds to this assessment by saying the British did not want to send the Irish relief out of fear of overpopulation and emigration to England, and the fear that the Irish would add to the number of peasants. The Irish had to do public service and export crops to get money and food (Poor Law Amendment). Coogan mainly blames the British government official Trevelyan, who believed that helping the Irish would promote dependence on the government and that giving state-subsidized food would compromise free market forces (Leddy). Coogan also argues that other countries were hit with the blight yet were able to survive (Behrens). In the famine, the British imperialistically tried to clear the land of the people, and to bring high farming to the country (Coogan). This claim of intentional ethnic cleansing lends itself to accusations of genocide as well. The Landlords of the Irish

also wanted their money and would spend their rent profits.

In “The Triumph of Dogma Ideology and Famine Relief,” Peter Gray explains the schools of economic thought in Britain and their influence on the way the British viewed and handled Ireland. Gray argues that all contemporary British theories about the famine were colored by the British bias against the Irish: “All these schools of thought interpreted the Famine disaster in the light of their own diagnoses of the ‘Irish problem’ and plans for Irish reconstruction” (Gray 29). The leading school of thought was that of the Orthodox economists, who were considered liberal Conservatives. They were optimistic that agriculture would grow faster than the population and aimed to invest in land and security for certainty of return profit. Ultimately, economic prosperity was more important than the well-being of the people. The next school of thought was the Manchester, who, like the Orthodox, desired free trade and laissez-faire economics and were very radical and extreme in their perspective. Also, the Manchester school regarded capital as merely accumulated labor. They were willing to force Irish landowners to employ the poor, and a “free trade in land” to replace them with agricultural entrepreneurs if the current owners failed. Heterodox writers shared views similar to those of the aristocracy. Also, those writers agreed that the Famine gave the government the opportunity to improve and reconstruct Irish society by giving the uncultivated lands to the poor. This policy did not work out, and nothing took its place. In addition, public works relief did not really do much, and the “helpless” poor still died. A part of the hostility towards the Irish had to do with the British financial crash of 1847, so government relief in Ireland was targeted. The Irish landowners were surprisingly excluded from the hate coming from the British. A leader named Clarendon worked with the landowners to try to help Ireland, but the plans failed because of

the fine line the British drew between helping and their economy. Ultimately, the Irish administration was probably the most advanced and interventionist in Europe, despite the narrow-mindedness of Victorian England. This claim is made because of the way that the Irish leaders handled the famine and the lack of support from Britain. Peter Gray does not think that the Irish Potato Famine was *per se* genocide, but rather that the British were just being averse to providing relief (Gray 26-34).

Gray, Kelly, and Coogan highlight the economic factors behind British policies and the famine, but they reach different conclusions about British culpability. The British were deeply involved in the Irish economy because Ireland was a part of the British Empire, a subject to the English king (Landis). This relationship between the two nations makes exempt Britain from responsibility for refusing to provide relief and assistance to Ireland during the famine, leaving Ireland on its own in the summer of 1847: “Laissez-faire, the reigning economic orthodoxy of the day, held that there should be little government with the economy as possible” (Donnelly). This policy had many consequences, such as putting an end to the soup kitchens in 1847 after merely six months of operation and the British resistance to the Irish immigration. Whether intentional or not, the effect of those unaltered economic policies and the belief in self-sufficiency and laissez faire led to the death of millions of Irish people.

Finally, religion also played a part in the famine. The British people basically believed that the Irish Catholics were the epitome of evil, so they believed that God caused the famine to punish the Irish Catholics with a “corrupt” agrarian system (Donnelly). The person responsible for providing relief during this time was Trevelyan, a leader of the Providentialism movement during this time, which indicates he may have had a religious motive for genocidal intent. The British

thought of the Irish as animalistic and less than human due to their difference of religion: the Irish being Catholic and the English being Protestant (Landis). Hughes points this out: “Some even assert that the Catholic religion is in reality the cause of poverty and degradation of Ireland. I have said enough to show that it has been at least an occasion; but I am willing to go farther, and admit that in one sense it has been the cause too; for I have no hesitation in saying that if the Irish, by any chance had been, had been Presbyterians, they would have, from an early day, obtained protection for their natural rights, or they would have driven their oppressors into the sea” (Hughes). According to Reverend Hughes, the Irish potato famine was not God’s providence. But, in contrast, Trevelyan believed that the famine was “the sharp but effectual remedy by which the cure is likely to be effected” (Donnelly). This belief by the English that the Irish were religiously and culturally inferior compounded their belief that the Irish were lazy and reinforced their support for economic policies intended to force them to be productive. The result was an unwillingness to alter policies on exports, immigration, and aid and the subsequent death of millions of Irish people.

The main question is whether intentions or consequences should be the criteria for a judgment of genocide. Intention is currently included in the UN criteria; however, genocide can occur without intent as well. The destructive consequences of an event are as important as the intent because they can’t be taken back. The refusal to provide relief to the Irish caused millions of deaths, while other countries dealing with the blight were able to survive with little damage.

I think that the Irish potato famine can be considered genocide despite the lack of clear intent. The English did hate the Irish and looked down upon them, even if they did not want to totally destroy the Irish people. The British also did

what was in England's best interest, without regard for the interests of their empire, as seen in Hughes' and Kelly's pieces. Even those like Peel, who may have tried to help, were restricted by their own perceptions of the Irish and the economic ideologies of the time. The British claimed they wanted to improve the economy of Ireland by enacting and repealing laws to create an industrial/higher farming economy. Also, the British wanted to supposedly strengthen the Irish work ethic and morality by making the Irish adapt through struggle. Finally, the British looked at the blight as God's will, and that no one was really responsible for action. In addition to this passive negligence, the Corn Law and the Poor Law amendment were policies that actively caused a lot of harm to the Irish people and could have been lifted during the famine.

Even if we limit our understanding of genocide to the 1948 UN convention definition, the Irish Potato famine could count as an act of genocide by the British government. The convention classifies as genocide the bodily or mental harm to a group. The bodily harm came from starvation as reported in William Bennett's *Narrative of a Recent Journey of Six Weeks in Ireland*. Starvation due to lack of resources and relief during the famine constitutes group destruction of the Irish population at the hands of their own government. Mental harm was caused by "learned helplessness," where the Irish became mentally unable to regard themselves as worthy of taking action to mitigate the effects of famine. This "helplessness" affected marriages and childbirth so it can be classified as biological genocide. The propaganda (comics) depicting the Irish as animals and inferiors and demeaning their Catholicism also created what historians of genocide call a social death and degradation of identity. This social death is a component of cultural genocide. While the UN does not prosecute the perpetrators of cultural genocide, most historians and

the originator of the term genocide, Raphael Lemkin, do classify cultural persecution and destruction of culture as genocide.

I think that the British definitely used this famine to diminish the Irish people, using lack of relief to cause starvation and poverty, in order to improve their own economy. England may have thought that the famine may have been a good way to finally not have to worry about the negative effects of a non-industrialized Ireland economy may have had on their own economy, or that the agricultural system may just fail and come to an end. There were other countries that were able to survive the blight with fewer repercussions than the ones Ireland had. Ireland could not recover, even if the people had fully rallied around the cause. England still did not help Ireland, despite having had financial means to provide assistance and relief. England still took grain from Ireland, while the Irish people were starving. No policies were set up or changed to provide relief to the Irish people during that time. Their economic selfishness was compounded by the stigma against the Irish people as being incompetent and inferior, and by the history of religious conflict between Protestant England and Catholic Ireland. Although there is no direct proof of genocidal intent from the British, I believe we must recognize the Irish Potato Famine as a genocide that stemmed from negligence and the failure to adapt constructive government policies.

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The Development of Dishonesty in Children

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To quote a stunning example of the cultural prevalence of deceit, we may look to the most ubiquitous author of the English-speaking world, William Shakespeare, as he writes, “Well I do nothing in the world but lie, and lie in my throat” (Shakespeare IV, 3, 12). Lies are fundamental to all of civilization. Unerringly, where there is language, there are lies. According to psychiatrist Thomas Szasz (1961), “It has long been my impression that lying is one of the most significant occurrences, mechanisms, or communications...in the field of psychiatry” (P. 272). However, given the importance of lying to psychiatry, there is still a marked deficit in the psychological investigation of dishonesty, particularly in its development. This paper shall review the current literature regarding the psychological understanding of lying among children as they develop this skill and the influence of parental and authority figures on the child’s honesty. While studies pertaining to similar aspects of childhood dishonesty come to fairly similar conclusions, more research is necessary particularly regarding children’s conceptual understanding of lying and the role of parents in identifying and demonstrating dishonest behavior. The purpose of this review is ultimately to generate a greater interest in this vital, though sometimes overlooked, phenomenon.

Prior to delving into the way children begin lying, it is necessary to first discuss the psychological significance of lying and the developmental issues related to telling the truth. A child can neither tell the truth nor lie until his or her cognitive processes have matured; similarly, the child must be able to distinguish between the inner world and the outer world in order to test reality (Ford, King, Hollander,

1988, p.555). Several authors have studied the importance of lying as a part of the cognitive development as it marks the ability of the child to separate herself, not only physically, but in terms of cognitive structure. If the child lies successfully—that is to say, she is not found out—to her parental figure, she establishes that her parent cannot read her thoughts nor can her parent know everything she does while they are physically separated. This allows the child to test the boundaries both of her parent's and her own capabilities. Thus, lying is recognized as a necessary factor in the child's cognitive development. According to one study performed by Heinz Kohut (1966):

Every shortcoming detected in the idealized parent leads to a corresponding internal preservation of the externally lost quality of the object. A child's lie remains undetected; and thus one aspect of the omniscient idealized object is lost; but omniscience is introjected as a minute aspect of the drive controlling matrix and as a significant aspect of the all-seeing eye, the omniscience of the superego (p. 247).

This statement essentially proposes that lying is a crucial aspect of the development of the child psyche as it allows the child to come to the conclusion that her parent is not omniscient and, therefore, allows the child to develop a sense of autonomy. However, he also states that the child realizes that her parent is not omniscient, and therefore cannot act as the singular source which controls her actions. Thus, according to Kohut, lying may also play a role in the development of self-regulation. In more recent work, psychiatrist Robert Hilt (2015) has come to similar conclusions regarding the importance of lying for cognitive development among children.

While lying is undoubtedly necessary for the child's development, the question remains as to whether or not children can comprehend this practice. The child's

understanding of what it means to tell a lie has both theoretical and practical significance. With regards to theory of mind research, this understanding is paramount as children's conception of lying is an important part of the development which connects children's early capacity to deceive with their later developing understanding of what it means for a person to have a false belief (for example, an instance in which someone believes that his wallet is in his pocket prior to realizing that he left it on his desk). In a 2003 study, researchers performed four experiments in which they asked children to differentiate between lies and pretending by presenting instances of each within the context of short stories. The researchers found that children use the term "lie" in order to describe every false statement, including statements of false beliefs. However, in the same study, children as young as the age of four were able to differentiate between lying and pretending when instances of each were presented in simple narratives (Taylor, Lussier, Maring, p. 320). They also found that, consistent with Piaget's claim (1965) stating that children consider lying to be doing something bad with language, children think of lying as being specifically associated with language while pretending is associated with taking on a persona or with movement and behavior. Peterson, Peterson, and Seeto (1983) similarly found that 5-year-olds clearly understood some concepts of lying, but tended to confuse these with moral prohibitions. To demonstrate this, 38% of the 5-year-olds studied defined cuss words as lies. They also equated guesses to lying more often than the older children.

In a 1993 study conducted by Ted Ruffman and David Olson, the psychologists attempted to gain further insight into whether children between the ages of three and four utilized deception in order to create false belief. They achieved this by reducing extraneous "task demands" in an effort to determine if children's difficulties

with deception tasks stemmed primarily from the level of complexity which the tasks demanded, rather than with a deficit in understanding of belief. The researchers performed three experiments, the first of which involved telling children a story which would allow them to understand that a deceptive act perpetrated by one character led to another character's false belief. The second experiment required children to choose evidence which would intentionally mislead someone. Finally, in the third experiment, children were asked, based on the evidence that they had chosen, what the misled person would assume. The results of each experiment suggest that young children in this age group do not understand deceptive acts in the same way that adults do and, while they may sometimes act deceptively, they are not cognizant that such behavior is a means of leading others to hold a false belief.

The practical necessity of understanding how capable children are of comprehending deception becomes particularly clear as it pertains to the use of child-witnesses in legal cases, particularly insofar as a demonstration of competency is required in order to allow children to testify in court. In a study conducted by psychologists Talwar, Lee, Bala, and Lindsay (2002), the researchers tested the ability of children, ranging in age from three to seven years old, to differentiate between lying and truth-telling and then tested their conceptual knowledge against their actual behavior. The researchers accomplished this by first placing children in a situation in which they would be tempted to lie. Afterwards, the researchers ascertained the children's understanding of lies and the morality of lying by telling them a story in which a character lies, then asking the children if the character told the truth, and having them tell whether or not the character behaved badly. The results from this study demonstrated that children in this age range did indeed understand the difference between lie- and truth-telling. They also found that as the age of the par-

ticipants increased so did the negativity with which they perceived the character's actions. However, even though the children understood the difference between a lie and the truth and that lying is morally wrong, many of the participants still told lies in practice. These findings counter the assumption that children who understand deception conceptually are less likely to lie themselves. Talwar et al. conducted a follow up experiment in which they performed the same series of activities, however, they also asked the children to promise to tell the truth. The researchers found that after the children promised to tell the truth, fewer children lied regarding their own transgressions.

A similar study was conducted in 2001 by psychologists Lyon, Saywitz, Kaplan, and Dorado, in which the researchers attempted to ascertain children's perceived level of obligation to tell the truth, specifically regarding their legal oath-taking competency. To demonstrate this, the researchers performed several experiments in which participants (maltreated or abused children between the ages of five and six) were divided into two categories. In the first group, children were questioned about the hypothetical consequences if they were to lie. In the second group, children were about the hypothetical repercussions for a story character if that character was to lie. The results of those experiments demonstrated that children were more likely to acknowledge the negative impact of lying when discussing others rather than themselves. This may be due to the unwillingness of young children to reason hypothetically if they view the premise as being unfavorable, or implausible. For example, a child might respond to a question as to the consequences of his own lies by saying that he simply would not lie, rather than stating that he might be punished. However, this result may also be because children may believe that they are invulnerable to punishment, and therefore may believe that while other children

will face consequences for lying, they would not. In either instance, this would not necessarily impact the children's competency to testify, especially when considering the slightly more recent research performed by Talwar et al., which indicates that children are more likely to be honest after having made promises on the matter (i.e. taking an oath) rather than after having been interrogated as to their level of understanding. In view of those two studies, it is clear that children's understanding of lie-telling and capacity to feel an obligation for truth-telling is generally underestimated and requires further research.

While the child's understanding of lies and lying is important for the study of this behavior, so too is the consideration for the child's ability to lie. According to a study conducted by psychologists Evans, Xu, and Lee (2011), children are able to tell strategic lies by making those lies consistent with physical evidence of their transgressions. The researchers performed this study by presenting children, ranging in age from three to five, with a temptation paradigm where the child would receive a present if he could guess a hidden object. However, if the child were to cheat, by peeking at the object, there would be obvious physical evidence. Experimenters found that lie-telling behavior increased with age, and that, even when presented with this physical evidence, the children who cheated were able to formulate a strategic lie consistent with the physical evidence in order to hide their transgression.

Similarly, according to psychologists Robert Mitchell and Nicholas Thompson (1986), "the first step in the young child's development of language use is the differentiation of words from particular goals" (p. 282). As children learn language, they originally learn that a general word refers to a specific item, but over time are able to broaden their definition of the word. Thus, in the mind of a child, "cookie" might at first mean a specific kind of cookie, but over time she will realize that there is a variety

of cookies and will refer to each kind appropriately. As these words begin to separate from specific goals or objects, the child can begin to take the listener's perspective into account and modify her speech to accommodate the listener, by explaining that the cookie she wants is in the cupboard, not the cookie jar, for instance. Children also learn over time that while some words are not dependent upon social context (even if a cookie is not readily available, a child can still ask for one) some words are dependent upon the context. One such example of this is the use of negation as it is dependent upon presupposition (Mitchell et al., 282). Once this concept is grasped, children are able to negate a presupposed statement. According to psychologists Nordmeyer and Frank (2013), children are capable of negating statements as early as the age of two. This presents an interesting point of consideration when discussing children's capacity for deception because it allows children to negate statements such as accusations. For example, if a child were to transgress by eating a cookie before dinner and was accused of doing so, assuming that the child is capable of negation, the child would be able to deny this accusation and, therefore, attempt to deceive her accuser.

However, deception is not always utilized for personal gain or to hide one's transgressions. In a 2007 study conducted by psychologists Talwar, Murphy, and Lee, the researchers attempted to further understand the capacity of children between the ages of three and eleven for prosocial lie-telling, also known as "white lies." The researchers accomplished this by using an undesirable gift paradigm in which the children were presented with an undesirable gift and then questioned by the gift-giver regarding their approval of the gift. The researchers found that in all cases, the majority of children told white lies. The tendency of this increased with age. These findings support "the increasing amount of evidence that verbal deception emerges early and develops rapidly" (Talwar et al., 2007), and also indicate that children

are also very inclined to tell prosocial lies for the sake of politeness.

Equally important to the current understanding of the child's capacity to lie is his ability to detect lies. According to one study conducted by psychologists Rotenberg and Sullivan (2003), in which children from several age groups (specifically kindergarten, second, fourth, and sixth grade) were asked to judge the honesty of their peers based on their physical cues, children as young as the age of five were able to discern anxiety based on gaze and limb movement. However, these results were more prevalent among older children. This was demonstrated by several experiments in which the researchers presented the participants with statements made by their peers. The children were then asked to decide whether the speaker was lying and describe how they came to this conclusion. The researchers explained that "according to the learning of the physiological cues for deception account" (Rotenberg et al., 2003), children learn certain cues associated with anxiety and thus infer that they are indicative of deception. The researchers continued by pointing out that "the other lines of research are based on the assumption that children cognitively appraise the person displaying the cues by assessing his or her intentions to deceive, strategies for hiding deception, or emotional states associated with deception." As was previously discussed, children's theory of mind abilities could be what promotes the use of anxiety cues to detect deception; however, the current research does not produce specific predictions about whether children will use these cues, and, if so, at what age they begin to show this pattern of reasoning.

Similarly, in yet another study conducted by Lyon, Carrick, and Quas (2009), children's ability to detect deception was analyzed. In this study, children between the ages of 4 and 6 were asked to either accept or reject true and false statements respectively, then they were asked to label true statements as "good" and statements that were lies as "bad." Much like the aforementioned study conducted by Lyon,

this study included both maltreated and non-maltreated children with special consideration given to the legal relevance of his findings. The researchers hypothesized that children would be more adept at accepting true statements and rejecting false statements than at labeling statements as “true,” “false,” “bad,” or “good.” The study yielded results which were consistent with this hypothesis, which demonstrates that children at a younger age are better able to identify and distinguish between true and false statements, than they are able to articulate this comprehension.

While lying and lie-detection are both skills indicative of the learned nature of lying, an equally necessary area of study is the source of such an education. In a 2014 study conducted by psychologists Chelsea Hays and Leslie Carver, researchers attempted to discern how children learn to lie and whether adults’ lying to children has an effect on children’s honesty. Children between the ages of three and seven were tested in a temptation resistance exercise. The participants were divided into two groups, a “truth” group and a “lie” group. In the “lie” group, the children were told a lie, after which the experimenter confessed to lying. In the “truth” group, the experimenter did not lie. Then, children were tested for lie-telling and cheating behaviors using a modified temptation resistance paradigm. They were placed in a situation in which they could not look at a toy and were told to guess which toy was behind them without peeking; however, the children were then given the opportunity to peek as the experimenter left the room. They were then asked if they had transgressed and peeked at the toy. According to the researchers’ results, “children were more likely to lie if they have been lied to (...) this study suggests rather that children may use the actions of adults as a model to determine whether they will engage in honest or dishonest behaviors” (Hays et al., 2014, p. 977). However, there was a distinct lack of evidence for this effect in the youngest group of

children, which may indicate that lying to children under the age of five may be inconsequential, but further research is required.

Equally important to the current understanding of children's capacity to follow adult models of honesty are the situational requirements which will motivate them to tell the truth. According to psychologist Shanna Williams (2010), children learn to lie primarily from their parents. These authority figures in the child's life will frequently express the idea that deceit is a negative act, and yet at the same time will instruct children to lie to others in order to preserve social cohesion and reputation. As the author writes, "It is within these first years that children learn the rules of deception and begin to demonstrate their use in everyday interactions" (7). In Williams' study, she attempted to see the influence of family members on the child's inclination to lie. She accomplished this by employing both a temptation resistance paradigm and a disappointing gift paradigm; however, Williams introduced a variable by dividing participants into two groups. In one condition, the children interacted with their own parent rather than with an unfamiliar experimenter. In the second, the children interacted only with the experimenter. The results indicated that, overall, children lie significantly less—be it for prosocial or antisocial reasons—to a parent than to unfamiliar adults.

Similarly, with regards to how children treat the transgressions of adults, children are more inclined to tell the truth about an adult's behavior if the child thinks that no negative consequences are associated with telling the truth. They are also more likely to tell the truth when encouraged to do so rather than when they are threatened with punishment for lying. This was demonstrated in a study conducted by psychologists Wagland and Bussey (2005), in which the researchers examined the extent to which children believe that truth-telling is inhibited by negative out-

come expectations. The results of this study suggest that positive reinforcement will provide a better incentive for children to be honest. This research highlights the importance of advocating the virtues of truth telling when promoting children's beliefs regarding veracious reporting. This conclusion is further supported by research conducted by psychologist Robert Hilt (2015), who outlines the preferred method for caregivers to teach honest behavior. He discusses the importance of caregivers to encourage truthfulness by not giving children the opportunity to lie. As he states:

For example, a parent who already knows that their child has done something that is not allowed, such as taking a sibling's toy, may initiate engagement by asking a question such as 'Did you take her toy?' This approach essentially asks the child to practice lying. The child knows a negative consequence will result if they say 'yes'. (p. 255)

Based on this explanation, a better approach would be to provide discipline based on the action, rather than give the child the choice between lying to escape a negative experience, or telling the truth, and definitely experiencing the repercussions.

In sum, several conclusions may be drawn from the results of these studies. The first is that children's ability to lie successfully increases as their verbal and cognitive skills increase. Second, children are less likely to lie if they do not fear punishment. Third, parental and authority figures have a great impact on the child's inclination to lie and the way in which they learn to lie. Finally, lying is a normal and healthy activity for young children as they develop and further explore the boundaries of the world around them. Ultimately, more research is required on this expansive topic, particularly with regard to the practical capabilities of children to demonstrate their understanding of lies as well as the impact of parental guidance upon honesty among children.

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*An Exploration of the Multifarious Reality
Through the Conscious Mind of a Recluse*

Heineken Queen B. Daguplo

Mentor Dr. Geoffrey Sadock

Oftentimes, authors are known for their quality of writing because it is a medium of articulating their ideas as well as a depiction of how they perceive the world. They are categorized into an era or movement to which their views belong. One of the most prominent authors in American Literature is Emily Elizabeth Dickinson, or Emily Dickinson. Dickinson was born on the 10th of December, 1830, when the transcendentalist movement was prevalent. She established her image by isolating herself from the world and writing with such originality (e.g., bizarre positioning of punctuation marks, capitalization of arbitrary words) that some criticize her for these qualities so strongly that they sometimes forget to reflect on her profound compositions. “She was a recluse; but her poetry is rich in a profound and varied experience,” wrote Allen Tate (qtd. in Bloom 117).

Brought up into a prominent family, Dickinson was very well-educated and highly literate. At the age of 14, she had already compiled an herbarium. The symbols of nature in her poems reflect her keen interest in the natural world. She attended Amherst Academy (now known as Amherst College) and Mount Holyoke Female Seminary (now Mount Holyoke College). Soon after Dickinson departed from Amherst Academy in 1848, she began living her life in seclusion in the Homestead and started writing copiously. Although she is best known for her reclusiveness and peculiar syntax, her poems and their recurring themes best portray the ideologies of human experience and reality.

One of Dickinson's earliest and most quoted poems is "I'm Nobody! Who are you?" for people often identify with it. As one of her earliest written poems, the poem has often been regarded as a reflection on the search for one's true identity. The speaker of the poem is still in the early stage of her life and she perceives herself as a nobody. The 8 lines that comprise this poem show the oxymoronic quality of Dickinson's poetry. The tone and the entirety of the poem suggest that being a "Nobody" (1) is more desirable than being a "Somebody" (5). To be "somebody" in a society means that they are lauded, while being "nobody" is like being a ghost—existing but not being noticed. On the contrary, Dickinson canonizes the idea of being a nobody by writing "How dreary – to be – Somebody!" (5). Perchance if someone is a public figure, people look up to them and their action then becomes concomitant with the attention that they receive, not knowing if that is who they truly are, or just a guise for the masses to see. This notion can be easily seen, especially since social media platforms have dominated the current generation, and provide easier access for the public to watch closely whomever they admire. For example, it is common knowledge that the majority of reality shows are scripted and not really *extempore*. Eric Hoyt, a professor at the University of Wisconsin, wrote on reality television:

What if we went further, and explored reality shows not simply in terms of what we saw on our own TV set, but compared that to what viewers in other countries saw on their screens, and examined what moves them? And what if we looked past the screen itself, into the business and production models behind these shows? (48)

Needless to say, Dickinson was not referring to Hollywood actors since television had yet to be invented, but she grasped how the inclination of well-known

people to establish a façade requires them to stick to the status quo. This poem also shows her aversion to fame.

Dickinson's poems are diversified and she is well-known for numerous themes. Her complex mind allowed her to explore the unfamiliar, thus producing proleptic writings. In her poem, "Hope' is the thing with feathers," she establishes that hope, like human conscience, is always present in people. The quotation marks around "hope" and the use of the word "thing" showcase the ambiguity that Dickinson strived to achieve. "It is pure abstraction, applicable to anything at all," says Helen Vendler (120). This is also one of the many reasons why Dickinson's writings relate to human experience; there are times when life brings challenges and the only thing people can do is hang on to hope. Moreover, paradoxically, she goes on to write: "And sore must be the storm – / That could abash the little Bird" (6-7). The first stanza ended with the words "and never stops – at all," yet now she is saying that a powerful storm can tremble hope. She further describes a particular aspect of hope:

I've heard it in the chilliest land –
And on the strangest Sea –
Yet – never – in Extremity,
It asked a crumb – of me. (9–12)

This stanza illustrates the unselfish facet of hope; the idea that, even during times when desperate measures are needed, hope resides within people and never asks anything in return. Dickinson's poems often involve nature as a symbol to transform the abstract into something palpable. "The fusion of abstract thinking with concrete presentation within a single poem is very characteristic of Emily Dickinson, and is one of her great strengths," states Kenneth Stocks (20). In this case, she compares hope to a bird. In literary contexts, birds are often perceived as free or

autonomous. The same applies with hope as a tool to drive mankind forward. Because of its independence, hope can also be destructive. Disappointments and false hope can sometimes terminate a person's aspirations. Dickinson wrote this poem in 1862, which overlaps with the American Civil War. It is possible to surmise that this poem was intended for those who were fighting with the hope of attaining their rights and freedom.

Moreover, Dickinson's isolation made her a prisoner of her own mind. Shortly after she wrote the aforementioned poem about hope, she composed a poem with wretched tonality that is often scrutinized by critics. Even the very first line of "I felt a Funeral, in my Brain" can easily startle a reader. It is a poem in which the speaker either watches her own burial and describes the setting:

And when they all were seated,
A Service, like a Drum –
Kept beating – beating – till I thought
My mind was going numb – (Dickinson 5-8)

or possibly an idea or thought is being enshrouded. However, funerals are attended, not felt; and certainly not in the brain. According to Vendler, "We are not here commiserating at a funeral; on the contrary, the speaker is, in every corporeal sense, alive and well. But the mind is unhinged. Its "surmise" has blanked out all of hope of personal survival after death" (230). As reported by the National Institute of Mental Health, 6.7% of adults in the United States experienced at least one major depressive episode. It is not far-fetched for one to envision his or her own death, only Dickinson articulated it in a sense that leaves a feeling and an image in the reader's mind. The periphrastic nature of this poem allows the reader to enter the intricate mind of Dickinson. The question, however, is whether it is an authentic feeling, or

a mere concoction of her enigmatic mind. Greg Johnson addresses this question by expounding:

Her obsession with death is directly related to her creative impulse and achievement; in the death poems, her anxiety provides impetus for a startling originality of imagery, tone, and rhetorical stance, as well as for a comprehensive examination of her quest in its larger context [...]. Only death made no sense, and thus she returned to it again and again, achieving artistic complexity and range through her personal frustration. (144)

As an intellectual, Dickinson's quest to explore novel things, and even elucidate what was already there because she had her own perception of things, distinguished her among the poets during her period.

Further, Dickinson's poetry touches upon myriad themes, but the most eminent is the theme of death. This recurring theme cannot go unnoticed and her seclusion can be discerned as a catalyst for its prominence in her work. One of her many complex poems that deals with death is "Because I could not stop for Death." It is a 24-stanza poem that tells a story about the moments before and after a person dies. The intricacy lies in the fact that only those who have already died know what happens after—if anything happens at all; yet Dickinson produced a piece that portrays human experience, thus making it easier to grasp the idea that she is trying to convey about death and the afterlife. "Because I could not stop for Death – / He kindly stopped for me," she writes (1-2). In a way, the speaker is implying that death is a chivalrous seducer who is willing to stop or be patient for the her fancy. She also conveys the labor of existence in this poem and perhaps the stages of life:

We passed the School, where Children strove
At Recess – in the Ring –

We passed the Fields of Gazing Grain –

We passed the Setting Sun – (9-12)

She uses anaphora to emphasize the routine that people experience throughout their lives. She also shows a common device that Gothic writers, such as Hawthorne and Poe, use—the setting: the hour of the day in which the sun sets, and the scene darkens. Needless to say, all people have, at least once in their life, thought about what would happen when they die. Shakespeare touched upon this concept through the character of Hamlet in his two most distinguished soliloquies in the famous play, *The Tragedy of Hamlet, Prince of Denmark*.

The psyche of the narrator most closely mirrors the ideology of the author who creates the narrator. Possessing a supreme cognitive process, while growing up with Calvinistic ideologies, led Dickinson to challenge and question these beliefs. She was an iconoclast, for she neither accepted nor rescinded these views. Glenn Hughes explicates Dickinson's conflicted outlook on life and religion:

Transcendentalist optimism and Emersonian serenity conflicted with her recognition of the dreadful and terrifying aspects of spiritual life, and of the unjustified sufferings and inexplicable evils that permeate human existence and nature. Instead of her spiritual insights revealing ever more clearly a grand harmony between the soul's experiences, the natural world, and divinity, they revealed instead profound and unresolvable paradoxes and disjunctions manifested most vividly, for her, in personal experiences of divine presence that alternated between loving communion and intense alienation, inspiring elation and traumatic despair. (287)

Furthermore, because death is a mystery to everyone, Dickinson kept coming back to it as though trying to find an answer. Because she was raised in a Calvinistic house-

hold, which was gradually dismantling during the time, her idea of the afterlife remained a puzzle. As Sandra McChesney states, “This juxtaposition of time, space, and exploration of the placing of the human mind at the junction of the two demonstrates the depth of Dickinson’s intellect and her ability to investigate the unknown with a sense of purpose and an ensuing sense of personal discovery” (qtd. in Bloom 65). Her ingenious creativity nevertheless allowed her to produce sensible images that most closely mirrored her comprehension of this unknown.

Additionally, Dickinson’s use of the words “immortality” (4) and “eternity” (24) in this poem reflects the religious environment she was raised in. According to Johnson, “Her poetry is not a series of answers but an ongoing experiment, [...] leaving her only with bewildered, fascinated awareness of eternity” (100). The uncertainty of what happens after death is enough reason to cause tension and uneasiness.

Moreover, researchers often revert to certain literary works, especially of a prominent figure, to further their conceptualization. Dickinson’s poem, “The Brain – is wider than the Sky,” is often used by psychologists to depict cognition. According to Rojcewicz, “Dickinson’s poetry is brilliant in imagery, language, a sense of wonder, and multiple themes related to philosophy” (262). Her mind was a labyrinth of sensibility and deep comprehension that enabled her to observe even a minute object with such scope and precision. The expression, “The sky is the limit,” reflects the common perception of vast space. In a way, this demonstrates Dickinson’s point that the brain is indeed wider than the sky—for a sky will always be just a sky, which ends within the celestial sphere; and, like a dome, it is not infinite. The brain, however, in the context of producing ideas, albeit called a “thinking capacity,” is only arbitrary. As we go forward in life, we garner experiences, which then expand our

knowledge. The next stanza strengthens her conviction that the mind is limitless. She writes:

The Brain is deeper than the sea –
For – hold them – Blue to Blue –
The one the other will absorb –
As Sponges – Buckets – do -. (5–8)

Henry W. Wells asserts that “Nature became the vast organ upon which Emily as a poet played the throbbingly emotional music of her life” (83). In a literary sense, a sea or an ocean is mostly a symbol for depth, enigma, or a region of undiscovered things; however, it still has a bottom. The brain, however, is capable of endless discoveries. Even scientists up to this day are still uncertain what the total capacity of the human brain may be. Dickinson terminates the poem by comparing the brain with the weight of God by saying, “And they will differ – if they do – / As Syllable from Sound” (11-12). What does she mean by this? Known as quite a religious rebel, perhaps the poem imitates the ability of God by comparing him with man, or vice-versa (*New International Version*, John. 1:14). “She exerts her peculiar poetic language in a way that helps deplore as well as explore the paradoxical human condition,” according to Cirakli (36). The ambiguities that lie in her poems may make one ruminate on the referential world in the poem. Readers must have a contemplative mind to analyze Dickinson’s poems because they are never to be taken at face value. Even when they sound simplistic, there is always a deeper meaning to be discovered.

Even though the theme of death is often associated with Emily Dickinson, she also produced notable poems that deal with life. I say life because poems can be perceived as how a person’s life progressively unfolds through experience. “Tell all

the truth but tell it slant” is a poem that can be read easily simply because of the shallow words that Dickinson decided to use. Although this may be true, the oblique usage of these words is the challenge in understanding the poem. Dickinson writes, “Tell all the truth but tell it slant” (1). Throughout the poem, however, she never addresses what the truth is. In lines four and seven, she uses the word “Truth” with a capital “T.” She also states that truth is too “superb” for our own resilience and is like lightning to the children (3–5). Perhaps because children are amazed by the sight of lightning, not knowing its destructive nature, “The Truth must dazzle gradually / Or every man be blind” (7–8). Does being blind imply that one will be unable to perceive something; or does it imply that one will willingly reject any knowledge pertinent to what blinded him? The poem itself is oxymoronic because “Truth does not always delight, surprise cannot come upon one gradually, the fears of children are not allayed by false comforting words that soften the reality of lightning, nothing dazzles gradually, and every man will not be blinded by coming face to face with Truth” (Crowder 239). This ties in with the aforementioned concept that the poem deals with life, specifically a coming of age where one slowly becomes wiser than they were before.

Yet, again, what exactly is the truth that she refers to? This poem was written in 1872. It is important to note that Charles Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species* had been published by then, which can possibly constitute the truth that Dickinson talks about. After the transcendentalist era emerges the period of realism, and Darwin’s theory is an enormous contribution to this change. Calvinists and Puritans during this period shuddered with horror when this theory was promulgated, and Dickinson, coming from a Calvinistic family—albeit recalcitrant about her religious views—can certainly have used this knowledge to project what was on her mind.

Can this truth, then, refer to the idea, or ideas sustained by naturalism? Does the truth have to be one thing only, or is it for the reader to decide what it is?

Additionally, using the words “all” (1) and “every” (8) exhibits how this *truth* is relative to mankind. According to Wells, “By exercising [this] imagination the poet discovers symbols which unite men by giving them as far as possible a common experience within the imaginative realm and thus proving to them their common share in actuality” (245-246). Going back to the subject of the coming of age, Dickinson was around the age of forty-two when she wrote this poem. She had already explored the multifariousness of reality by seeking something new every time she looked at something old, and she matured from those experiences. The tone of inclusiveness in said poem voices the concern of the speaker to the reader, as though trying to educate him or her, or perhaps shield him or her from an inevitable appalling element of the reality that is to come.

Emily Dickinson was quietly a radical poet who experimented in all of her creations, and who explored the unorthodox syntax she proudly utilized. The equivocal nature of her poems allows a reader to connect with her. Reading her poems can be compared to a drawbridge in which one side is what Dickinson meant when she wrote the poems, and the other is how the reader interprets them. There will always be an element between those two things that is going to converge. Today’s reader may not be much different from Emily Dickinson—that is, with the exception of her literary prowess. She has always been regarded as *the* recluse, yet the majority of her poems deal with everyday life, which is why people can relate to them. Although her poems are written with such poise and intricacy, they are nevertheless relevant to human experience. Detaching herself from the mass and stepping away from the big picture afforded her an overview of her contemporary

world. Her seclusion allowed her to further delve not only into her own mind, but into the outside world as well, enabling her to write literary pieces that have had an enormous impact on American Literature.

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Rewriting the Virgin of Guadalupe in Gloria Anzaldúa's
"Coatloapeuh, She Who Has Dominion over Serpents" and
Sandra Cisneros' "Guadalupe the Sex Goddess"

Elvia Ascencio

Mentor Dr. Maria Makowiecka

Both Gloria Anzaldúa and Sandra Cisneros debunk the prevailing myth of the Virgin of Guadalupe, a colonial construct of a passive female deity for Mexican women, and restore the lost Aztec myth of the goddess Coatloapeuh, who assures a full range of experience to women. Since the 1920s movement of *indigenismo*, the efforts to reinstate native beliefs and iconography, the Virgin of Guadalupe has been reinterpreted as a native female force. The name Coatloapeuh is an aspect of Tonatzin, the earlier fertility and Earth goddesses, whereas the name "Coatloapeuh," from the Nahuatl dialect, means a serpent, or she who wears a serpent skirt. Whereas the Catholic Church uses the Virgin of Guadalupe as a symbol to suppress women's sexuality, Anzaldúa and Cisneros see her as a replica of Coatloapeuh, the sex goddess in charge of her own sexuality, an inspiring model to modern women. For many Latinas, the Virgin of Guadalupe represents female perfection, and young girls are taught to emulate her. In a culture where a female religious icon literally influences everyday life, and is capable of stirring the absolute devotion of her followers, one might think that women are highly valued and occupy an important place in society; however, Guadalupe actually reifies the idea of female submission. Gloria Anzaldúa and Sandra Cisneros analyze the myth and its influence on Mexican and Chicana women, and debunk the Catholic doctrine. In their respective essays, "Coatloapeuh, She Who Has Dominion over Serpents" and

“Guadalupe the Sex Goddess,” Anzaldúa and Cisneros reinvent the female goddess myth, and, arguably, create and reinforce the founding theme of the Chicana movement. This essay is an interdisciplinary exploration of literary texts, based on the textual representations of female deities, and the actual visual representations. Whereas Gloria Anzaldúa, Sandra Cisneros and Yolanda López created their work during the second wave of feminism, about thirty years ago, their conclusions remain applicable in the current, arguably anti-feminist, and certainly anti-Mexican atmosphere.

Anzaldúa and Cisneros wrote their revisionist texts in the 1980s, when Chicana literature surfaced with the appearance of a larger group of influential women writers, including Cherríe Moraga, Chela Sandoval, Norma Alarcon and Ana Castillo, all of whom represent and interpret the reality of the lives of Latinas, including the influence of religion. The revisions of the Virgin of Guadalupe appear in the art of the period as well, including the vivid “Portrait of the Artist as the Virgin of Guadalupe” by Yolanda López (1978), in which the new Virgin of Guadalupe literally jumps off the pedestal the old Guadalupe was permanently attached to. Both Anzaldúa and Cisneros use their personal experiences to write about this subject. Chicanas are Mexican-American women who typically occupy an inferior position in society, not only in American culture, but also in the Chicano and Latin cultures where they are often stereotyped and vilified due to poverty, racism, and sexism. The topic seems to still resonate strongly in our society today. Anzaldúa and Cisneros have been the voice for this minority group, which has been invisible for such a long time. Carmen Heydee Rivera explains, “The Chicana writer ... is the keeper of the culture, keeper of the memories, the rituals, the stories, the superstitions, the language, the imagery of her Mexican heritage. She is also the one who changes the culture, the one who breeds a new language and a new

lifestyle... a new legacy for those who still have to squeeze into legitimacy as human being and American citizens” (7). The work of Chicana writers has become exceptionally important in part because it re-appropriates the negative associations attached to Chicana identity and reinvents this identity as empowering. Anzaldúa and Cisneros bring a sense of pride to Chicanas everywhere, encouraging them to embrace their culture and language. Chicana writers have been accused of being against family and culture because their writings have encouraged women to reject the traditionally prescribed roles they occupy in their families:

Chicana women’s identities are defined on the basis of their role as mothers and wives, that is, women are expected to exist solely within the family structure. As the foundation of the family unit, a Chicana must prioritize the needs of family members above her own. Good Chicanas are expected to be completely devoted to their families, warm, and nurturing. They are expected to emulate the virtues of the revered cultural symbol, the Virgen de Guadalupe. (Garcia 8)

Chicana revisionist writings encourage women to question their role in their families and find a more accurate role model, one who has a dark, rebellious, and sexual side, like Coatlopecuh. Since the publication of *This Bridge Called My Back*, a collection of articles centered on the lives of women of color, edited by Cherríe Moraga and Gloria Anzaldúa, and published in 1981, the cultural context and the lived experience of women of color has been theorized in separation from the mainstream white feminism.

The myth of the Virgin of Guadalupe, as told in Mexico, originated on the hill of Tepeyac, Mexico, on December 9, 1531, when Juan Diego, a humble Aztec Indian, who had recently converted to the Catholic faith, reported having a vision of

the Virgin Mary, Mother of God, who asked him to go to the Bishop and tell him to build a church where she would offer all her love, compassion, help, and protection to Mexican people. Juan Diego did as she asked, but the Bishop requested proof that this message was really from the Virgin. On December 12, 1531, she appeared to Juan Diego again and showed him the most beautiful roses. It was a miracle that the roses were there and in bloom, since they appeared to grow in infertile soil, where only cactus and thistles grew. Juan Diego put the roses on his *tilma*, or poncho, and showed them to the bishop and, right before their eyes, the image of the Virgin of Guadalupe began to form on the cloth. Bishop Juan de Zumarraga fell to his knees, asked the people to build a church for her on the Hill of Tepeyac, and encouraged the veneration of the Virgin of Guadalupe.

Pope Benedict XIV approved her veneration and authorized her feast and mass for December 12, and Pope Pius X declared her patroness of Latin America. The Church actually disapproved of the growing veneration of the Virgin initially, because she was endowed with the qualities of the Aztec goddess Tonantzin, meaning “Our Revered Mother” in Nahuatl, and was therefore considered sacrilegious. She was represented as a mestiza, with straight, dark hair, and was believed to perform miracles, a practice condemned by the Church, which discouraged idolatry. Ana Castillo asserts that “Myths are the stories that explain a people’s beliefs about their purpose for living and their reason for dying,” and explains how Catholic myths forcibly replaced some of the Mexican indigenous beliefs, and how those efforts were met with an unwillingness on the part of the Native people to abandon their own gods and traditions for the Spaniards’ religion. The myth of the Virgin of Guadalupe certainly worked in favor of the Catholic Church because, not accidentally, the Virgin of Guadalupe appeared ten years after the Spaniards conquered

Mexico and, during a period of six years, about nine million indigenous people were converted to Catholicism.

When the Spaniards came to Mexico at the beginning of the 16th century, Mexicans worshiped multiple female deities such as Mayahuel, the goddess of agave, Mictecacihuatl, the goddess of the underworld, and Coatlicue, the goddess of fertility. Those goddesses had much importance and many temples and other places of worship were built for them. To diminish the importance of the local gods, the Spaniards destroyed many of those sacred places and replaced them with Catholic churches. The Hill of Tepeyac, for example, was the sacred place where the goddess Tonantzin, “Mother Earth,” was worshiped. It is assumed that the Spaniards knew that the Hill of Tepeyac and the goddess who was worshiped there were very important for the Native people – it was indeed a perfect place to replace the old goddess as well. “When Catholic Spanish missionaries arrived after the indigenous peoples of Mexico were conquered, they often erected churches on sites that were already sacred to the population for worshipping indigenous gods and goddesses. Church officials encouraged worship of the Virgin Mary, since that made for an easier transition for people with a tradition of mother-goddess worship” (Cook). Spaniards used the myth of the Virgin of Guadalupe to convert the Native people to Catholicism and submit them to the colonial power. Effectively, the Native people were robbed of their land, enslaved, and mistreated, but now they had the Virgin of Guadalupe, who was their mother, protector, and comforter. Guadalupe was created by the Catholic Church to be the comfort of the poor, the guard of the weak, and the support of the oppressed. In other words, the myth of the Virgin of Guadalupe was created to alleviate the suffering and oppression that the Spaniards and the Catholic Church, in particular, had inflicted on the Native people. An ubiquitous

image of the Virgin of Guadalupe includes the figure in an oyster-like shell, surrounded by a garland of roses with the Hills of Guerrero and Zacatenco in the background, both related to native worship, located in the present Park of El Tepeyac (Fig. 1).



Figure 1: Unknown. *The Virgin of Guadalupe*. Web.

For many Mexicans and Chicanos, the Virgin of Guadalupe is everything. She is not just a Mexican symbol; she is Mexico. As Gloria Anzaldúa affirms, “Today la virgen de Guadalupe is the single most potent religious, political, and cultural image of the Chicano/*Mexicano*. She, like my race, is a synthesis of the old world and the new” (52). She embellishes churches, houses, restaurants, taxis, and buses, etc. The Virgin of Guadalupe is praised in poetry and songs and her shrine is visited by millions of pilgrims every year. The Virgin of Guadalupe has always had a very important role in Mexican national ethos. Miguel Hidalgo, a Mexican Catholic priest and a leader of the Mexican War of Independence, touted her as the guardian of the revolution against the Spanish in 1810. Emiliano Zapata’s rebels also carried banners of the Virgin of Guadalupe when they entered Mexico City in 1914, and, in 1926 during the Civil War in Mexico, the rebels also carried banners with

her image. In and out of Mexico, and in any protest or celebration, Mexicans have carried banners with her image. December 12 is the Virgin of Guadalupe's Day, and many Mexicans gather at the Basilica of Our Lady in Tepeyac, Mexico, to honor her. An endless parade of pilgrims from all over the country bring her flowers, songs, chants and prayers. Across the United States, the Day of the Virgin of Guadalupe is also celebrated by many Latinos. One of the largest processions takes place in Chicago, where thousands of people gather at the shrine in Des Plaines, Ill. In Los Angeles, the oldest procession has been celebrated since 1931, in the Roman Catholic Archdiocese, and in New York, there is a procession from Central Park to St. Patrick's Cathedral.

In order to understand Chicana literature and culture, one must also understand why the Virgin of Guadalupe is vital for Mexicans and Chicanos: the Virgin of Guadalupe is the core of Mexican culture as she represents the gods of all five main Mexican civilizations: the Olmec, Maya, Teotihuacan, Toltec, and Aztec. After Mexicans had been conquered, a new language, religion, and traditions were forced upon them, and the Virgin of Guadalupe, however contrived, is the last link to their ancient culture, which in part explains the devotion given to her. In "Coatlalopeuh, She Who Has Dominion over Serpents," Anzaldúa analyzes the origins of the Virgin of Guadalupe: "Coatlalopeuh is descended from, or is an aspect of, earlier Mesoamerican fertility and Earth goddesses. The earliest is Coatlicue, or 'Serpent Skirt.' She had a human skull, or a serpent for a head, a necklace of human hearts, a skirt of twisted serpents and taloned feet. As a creator goddess, she was the mother of the celestial deities. Another aspect of Coatlicue is Tonantzin" (49).

(Fig. 2).



Figure 2: *Statue of Coatlicue*. Sculpture 1300-1500CE.

Anzaldúa believes that the Virgin of Guadalupe is the Christian version of Tonantzin whose temple was on the hill of Tepeyac, where the Virgin of Guadalupe first appeared to Juan Diego. Most Mexicans and Chicanos do not practice traditional Roman Catholicism as introduced by the Spaniards; rather, they practice a modified version mixed with indigenous beliefs and traditions. Anzaldúa tells us what has happened to Tonantzin: “After the conquest, the Spaniards and their church continued to split Tonantzin/Guadalupe. They desexed Guadalupe, taking Coatlatlopeuh, the serpent/sexuality, out of her (...) Thus Tonantzin became Guadalupe, the chaste protective mother, the defender of the Mexican people” (49). It is important to understand how Anzaldúa explains the origins of the Virgin of Guadalupe because, she argues, the Virgin does not oppress women, but she is instead also a victim of the European religious doctrines that oppress and control women, especially women’s sexuality. Anzaldúa criticizes her male-dominated community for pushing women to be subservient and for offering them limited choices: to become a nun, a prostitute, or a wife and mother” (Snodgrass). Anzaldúa’s writings about the Virgin of Guadalupe are significant in part because she explores a very sen-

sitive topic within the Catholic dogma. She has a lot in common with Cisneros, who also writes about the idea that many Latinas, Chicanas, and *Mexicanas* identify with the Virgin of Guadalupe because they long for a connection with their ancient culture.

Interestingly, Anzaldúa sees the Virgin of Guadalupe also as a god without gender or ethnicity, a god who loves and accepts everybody regardless of their gender, ethnicity, or sexual preference. Anzaldúa introduces a more enticing version of the Virgin of Guadalupe to a large group of Latin women who have been told, for a long time, that the Virgin of Guadalupe would reject them because of their sexual desires and preferences. Anzaldúa argues that the church divided Coatlalopeuh into good and evil, sexual and asexual, and decided to keep Guadalupe without any sexuality. Chicanas and Mexican women have found a new way to worship the old spirit Coatlicue, the serpent goddess, through Guadalupe. “Coatlalopeuh, She Who Has Dominion over Serpents” is a section of Anzaldúa’s book *Borderland/la Frontera*, dedicated to Mexicans on both sides of the border, especially to those who live in the geographical area that is inclined to a mix, one that is neither entirely of Mexico, nor entirely of the United States, and who cannot differentiate those invisible borders, and who instead have learned to be part of both countries. All of the essays and poems in *Borderland/la Frontera* illustrate the experiences of Chicanas dealing with religion, culture, and femininity. “Anzaldúa has concluded that the powers of the Serpent are occluded rather than promoted by Maria Guadalupe, the domesticated version of Aztec/Toltec goddesses who had both positive and negative attributes that, she claims, were dualized by the church along the virgin/whore dichotomy” (Lioi). Anzaldúa stresses that culture is made by those in power, and those in power are usually white and male, making the fight against the marginalization of Chicanas even harder.

For Chicana and feminist writers, the virgin of Guadalupe is a subject worthy of thorough exploration because it is such a significant part of Chicana culture. Sandra Cisneros considers the Chicana identity and the challenges of being between Mexican and American cultures. In “Guadalupe the Sex Goddess,” Cisneros questions the virgin of Guadalupe’s role in the life of many Chicanas, and she often writes about the guilt and shame that religion inflicts, mainly on women. Chicanas do not have many choices, and they are limited to two options: good or bad, virgin or whore. In Chicana culture, the value of a woman rests on her virginity and not her intellect, as Chicanas are expected to be virginal; however, they are not told how to keep their virginity because their mothers do not talk about sex with them. Culture and religion are responsible for the lack of information about Chicanas’ sexuality, which creates a lack of confidence and security. According to Cisneros, the Virgin of Guadalupe is a very powerful icon that represents many negative aspects about women’s passive sexuality, and sexual ignorance.

Don’t get pregnant! But no one tells you how not to. This is why I was angry for so many years every time I saw a la Virgen de Guadalupe, my culture’s role model for brown women like me. She was damn dangerous, an ideal so lofty and unrealistic it was laughable. The Church ignored them and pointed us women toward our destiny marriage and motherhood. The other alternative was putahood. (48)

Cisneros exposes the danger of a culture that does not inform women about the advantages and disadvantages of being sexually active. In Chicana culture, sex is a taboo, and Chicanas do not find information about sex at home, in church, or from other young girls because they are taught not to talk about sex. It is difficult and confusing for Chicanas to develop a healthy sexual identity because their culture

encourages them to also be feminine and sensual by wearing sexy outfits and learning to dance seductively. Young girls often get the talk from their mother about the importance of learning to wear high heels because they make their legs look longer, elevate their buttocks, and help to swing their hips better. Chicana culture encourages women to be sexy, but they cannot be actively sexual because sex is a sin, and they have to be virgins until marriage.

Cisneros describes her high school years as a time when she was embarrassed about her body, and how, even at the age of twenty-one, while she was in college, she still found it difficult to discuss sex or birth control, even with her gynecologist. "I had never seen my mother nude. I had never taken a good look at myself either" (46). She blames her culture and the myth of the Virgin of Guadalupe for being an ideal, highly unrealistic image of what a Chicana should be. Cisneros does not lessen or deny the powerful influence of the Virgin of Guadalupe in her culture, but she rewrites the myth of the Virgin of Guadalupe from a different perspective in order to get closer to her and present a more appealing version to her fellow Chicanas who do not fully understand this powerful myth. "My Virgen de Guadalupe is not the mother of God. She is God. She is a face for a god without a face, an *indigena* for a god without ethnicity, a female deity for a god who is genderless, but I also understand that for her to approach me, for me to finally open doors and accept her, she had to be a woman like me" (50). Cisneros sees the Virgin of Guadalupe as a mother and the protector of most Mexicans, a figure who is full of love, compassion, and understanding for her people, one that should not be used as a symbol to oppress women.

When I look at la Virgen de Guadalupe now, she is not the Lupe of my childhood, no longer the one in my grandparents' house in Tepeyac, nor is she the one of the Roman Catholic Church, the one I bolted the door

against in my teens and twenties. Like every woman who matters to me, I have had to search for her in the rubble of history. And I have found her. She is Guadalupe the sex goddess, a goddess who makes me feel good about my sexual power, my sexual energy, who reminds me that I must, as Clarissa Pinkola Estés so aptly put it, “[speak] from the vulva ... speak the most basic, honest truth,” and write from my *panocha*. (51)

This is the new Guadalupe, the sex goddess that any Latina would be able to identify with. For many Latinas, it is very difficult to reconcile their culture and their feminist ideas, and that is why this new aspect of the virgin of Guadalupe is so refreshing, especially for Latinas who are tired of being isolated within the realm of Catholicism, and the crushing silence regarding their sexuality.

Cisneros does not separate her personal life from her writings; instead, she has found a way to include her experiences to have an intimate connection with Latin women: “She has discovered how to uncover the subtle and intricate web of connections that bind the personal with the cultural. Cisneros begins with personal experiences, feelings, and thoughts...” (Madson 28). She has always advocated for Latin women because she knows that they go through a lot of victimization, but they are also very strong. For many years, Cisneros has worked with women and teenagers in the Latin community.

She frequently went to inner-city neighborhoods to talk to Latino/a teenagers, usually low income and educationally disadvantaged students, about the possibilities of obtaining a college degree. The fact that she was a bilingual Latina and came from the same barrio as many of these teenagers did, helped her to get through to the distrustful teens and parents who were usually not exposed to conversations about higher education. (Rivera 25)

She acknowledges that the historical and mythical figure of the Virgin of Guadalupe has influenced the perception of femininity in Latin women. Latinas have been taught that piety, submissiveness, domesticity and virginity are the characteristics of a good woman, and therefore the virgin of Guadalupe has been the perfect role model. In the final part of "Guadalupe the Sex Goddess," Cisneros restates that Guadalupe is not a sexless goddess who demands virginity from women. The virgin Guadalupe is the Catholic version of Coatlicue, who is neither a virgin nor submissive, but who is rebellious and authoritative, and she is a mother and a sex goddess at the same time:

When I see la Virgen de Guadalupe I want to lift her dress as I did my dolls, and look to see if she comes with *chones* and does her *panocha* look like mine, and does she have dark nipples too? Yes, I am certain she does. She is not neuter like Barbie. She gave birth. She has a womb. Blessed art thou and blessed is the fruit of thy womb... Blessed art thou, Lupe, and, therefore, blessed am I. (51)

This is the Virgin of Guadalupe Cisneros can identify with. A Guadalupe who has dark nipples, a vagina, and a womb, who looks like her, and she is blessed not because she is a virgin, but simply because she is a woman. She allows her to understand how she was blessed in her womanhood, her sex, and her sexuality. Cisneros declares that she is blessed because the Virgin of Guadalupe is blessed, and Guadalupe and she share the same qualities. Therefore, she and her fellow women should occupy a distinguished place in the Chicana community, precisely like the Virgin of Guadalupe does. Chicanas should be able to find love, compassion, and protection in the Virgin of Guadalupe, and religion should not use her to demand submission and virginity from women.

Sandra Cisneros often refers to the Virgin of Guadalupe in her writings, and, in particular, to The Virgin's influence on female sexuality. In "Guadalupe the Sex Goddess," Cisneros describes her own experience living in a crowded house with no privacy to explore her own body, and a family that would not talk about sex with her. Cisneros describes an experience with a man during which she had sex without contraceptives because she felt ashamed to talk about it with him. She also says that discovering sex was something powerful for her. In *The House on Mango Street*, two young female characters discuss the snow as a metaphor: one of the girls thinks that there are only two types of snow, the clean one and the dirty one, much like the two existing options for girls, as illustrated by the Virgin. "Little Miracles" in *Hollering Creek* is a collection of letters placed at the shrine of the Virgin of Guadalupe. Those letters filled with life stories capture the voices of the distressed, but faithful, Mexicans living on the Mexican border. In *Caramelo*, a major theme is the influence of the Virgin of Guadalupe on Chicana culture, a culture that flatly denies a sexual education to its women.

The famous portrait of Yolanda López as the Virgin of Guadalupe visualizes the challenges to the static Guadalupe (Fig. 3).



Figure 3: Yolanda López, *Portrait of the Artist as the Virgin of Guadalupe*, 1978, Oil pastel on paper.

López suggests a more realistic role model for Chicanas. In the portraits of her grandmother, her mother, and herself as the Virgin of Guadalupe, she emphasizes the strength, wisdom, power, and uniqueness of each woman at a different age. In López's self-portrait, above, she appears strong, powerful, and liberated from the immobile posture in the traditional representation. Her legs are muscular, she is running free from subjugation and social stigmas and, in her hand, she holds a snake by the neck as a sign that she is in charge of her own life and sexuality. Wearing sports shoes, she has trampled on the figure of the converted Aztec, the Catholic Saint Juan Diego, and the modesty cloth has become a super-heroine's cape.

Religion is one of the strongest motivators of human behavior and, throughout history, it has been used to oppress and control women. Hence, people, and Latinas in particular, need to constantly reevaluate the myths and beliefs that provide guidance; that is, it is critical to debunk the still prevailing myth of the Catholic-born Guadalupe, and restore the missing, ancient quality of the goddess Coatlicueh. Gloria Anzaldúa's and Sandra Cisneros' rewriting of the myth of the Virgin of Guadalupe has enabled many Latinas to relate to Guadalupe, the ancient goddess, and Guadalupe, the mother and the sex goddess, a complete deity and woman from before the time the Catholic Church split her and took her sexuality away, and before she became a superficial replica of Coatlicueh. Anzaldúa and Cisneros discredit the existing myth of Guadalupe and reveal it to be a colonial invention made for political reasons; they rewrite Coatlicueh as an empowering figure who, disguised as the Virgin of Guadalupe, encourages them to embrace their sexuality and the strength that women naturally possess, and, in so doing, they encourage Chicanas

to live their lives fully and to feel free and be proud of their culture and sexuality.

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Simulated Truth: A Study of Simulacra in Modern Photography

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Mentor Dr. Suzanne Boettger

While the most common reference to current experience of digital media on multiple platforms addresses the overwhelming plethora of images, the most salient issue is not the extent to which we experience stimulation, but of simulation. Issues of material “truth” have increasingly been taken up in contemporary photography. Visual art has employed simulacra, an insubstantial form or semblance of something, since the early 1980s in photographs by New York artists such as Sherrie Levine, Richard Prince and Cindy Sherman that replicate and play with preexisting pictures. Today, when an artist such as Brooklyn-based Lucas Blalock places small circular photographs of actual strawberries atop photographs of candies in wrappers photographically printed with the seeded red image of strawberries and their green stems - signs indicative of strawberries - he is toying with identities regarding “truth” and “simulacra.” The textual affinities that separate the real strawberries from the wrappers are further accentuated when laid against the nubby surface of small-gauge bubble wrap (Fig. 1).



Figure 1: Lucas Blalock, *Strawberries (forever fresh)*, 2015, Pigmented inkjet print.

Blalock exemplifies how artists have adopted new methods of photographic manipulation to present simulacra and examine issues of authenticity. Many may argue that the use of post-exposure manipulation renders images inauthentic. However, objective photographic “truth” is an ideal held only by those who have never confronted the number of options possible between camera settings and environmental settings when making a photograph. These artists aim not for objective transparency but for a questioning of its very possibility. Furthermore, their manner of incorporating simulation emphasizes the phenomenon as a frequent factor of current experience, while displaying personality, insight and originality.

Reality and imitation are often so entwined that it may be difficult to differentiate between them. Consider the short story “On Exactitude in Science,” by Jorge Luis Borges. The narrative tells of a group of cartographers who set out to create a map “whose size was that of the Empire, and which coincided point for point with it” (325). The result was a map that charted the Empire on an exact 1:1 scale. Succeeding generations, however, believed that the map was of no use and allowed for it to be destroyed. Borges concluded his story by describing a destroyed map without evidence of the original geography. One could interpret this as an analogy for the very simulations that are observed in everyday life, the belief that the map is not the territory that it imitates. However, the French philosopher Jean Baudrillard presents an alternative analysis in his 1981 book *Simulacra and Simulation*. In reading Borges’ map, Baudrillard states, “The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory—*precession of simulacra*—that engenders the territory” (1). The anteriority of simulacra, argues Baudrillard, is what gives our reality meaning.

Consider a McDonald’s billboard that features a photo of a cheeseburger,

arranged by a food stylist. Is the advertisement a picture of an actual extant burger, or is it more of a constructed idealization of a fantasy cheeseburger to come? Actually, the product that is served within millions of McDonald's daily is made to represent the image in the billboard. The idea of precession of simulacra states that reality, much like the cheeseburger in the McDonald's kitchen, is framed to represent a pre-existing imitation of something. What is the distinction, then, between the simulation presented in the advertisement and the simulation presented in the actual cheeseburger?

One analysis of Baudrillard's philosophy classifies simulacra into four distinct levels of relation to an object's respective original: A simulation (1) is the reflection of basic reality, (2) masks and perverts a basic reality, (3) masks the absence of a basic reality, or (4) bears no relation to any reality whatsoever (Boulter 355-77).

The concept of simulation and simulacra is not an esoteric aspect of a single discipline; it can be observed across a multitude of fields. Albeit not by name, Virginia Woolf describes the phenomenon of simulation in her critical essay "Modern Fiction." In this essay, Woolf asserts that "Whether we call it life or spirit, truth or reality, this, the essential thing, has moved off, or on, and refuses to be contained any longer in such ill-fitting vestments as we provide. Nevertheless, we go on perseveringly, conscientiously, constructing our two and thirty chapters after a design which more and more ceases to resemble the vision in our minds," (2087) outlining the idea that fiction is less an imitation of reality and more so a model for an idea of reality that is born from the author's mind. Furthermore, Woolf goes on to criticize novelists of the time period on the basis that they tend to add comedy, tragedy and love interest to their writing in an effort to fulfill a perceived rubric for how novels must be, which Woolf perceives as untrue to real life. Woolf writes, "Look within

and life, it seems, is very far from being ‘like [novels]’” (2089). Henceforth, Woolf has determined that the novels of her time are but a simulation of true reality, dressed much like a cheeseburger in an advertisement, to present an accessibly marketable version of its original.

Outside of the arts, the concept of simulacra can be applied to aspects of social science, including the field of communication. A “Positive Face” is defined as “the desire to be viewed positively by others, to be thought of favorably” (Devito 44). This desire might guide a person to act in a way that is unlike his or her natural state; one textbook uses the term “positive politeness” to describe the method in which people use formal register and appropriate expressions of politeness to convey a likable persona (44).

Modern photography that composes itself from the pieces of an image-based culture is inevitably exercising what in the 1980s-art world was termed “appropriation,” or the intentional borrowing, copying, and re-contextualization of existing images and objects from diverse sources. Since the early 1980s, work by artists such as Levine, Prince and Sherman has featured simulacra, an insubstantial form or semblance of something. The act of appropriation does more than make use of old photographs—the artist severs whatever image he or she is appropriating from its original context, allowing it to assume a new meaning and engender different emotions from its original. In her series of “Untitled Film Stills,” Sherman appropriated filmic tropes of the 50s and 60s “B” movies by placing herself into stereotypical roles of women in such films (Fig. 2).



Figure 2: Cindy Sherman, *Untitled Film Still #35*, 1979.

In doing so, Sherman presented a visual model for the artificial roles that people are drawn to imitate.

Levine's work was "less concerned with the obvious ironies of simple appropriation than with the transmittal of knowledge of the original work through its replication" (Marincola 24). Her style of appropriation, which consisted of re-photographing copies of already well-known images by different artists, spoke to the dwindling room for originality in a society that is saturated with images. However, Levine does not make this statement to discount the photographic medium as art. Instead, her work underscores the most critical property of photography as a representation, and defines the original work of art that she re-photographs as yet another product subject to consumption. Current practices emphasizing simulation develop out of those of a few decades ago, fueled by modern technology and an ever-growing bank of material for appropriation.

A recent photography exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art aptly titled "Ocean of Images" showcased the works of artists who make use of digital manipulation as a means to execute appropriation in their photographs. Blalock, a Brook-

lyn-based photographer, makes use of the stamp tool in Photoshop to create a simulated landscape out of the texture of wood. A 2013 image, entitled *Picture for Mark II*, features a repetition of circular stamps of wood in the shape of a brown landscape. Towards the top of the image, Blalock artificially colors the wooden-texture stamp with a green hue, as if to resemble trees (Fig 3).



Figure 3: Lucas Blalock, *Picture for Mark II*, 2013, Pigmented inkjet print.

Overall, the photo conveys a concept of defective artifice, as the shape of the stamp and the clearly defined texture of the wood discredit any possibility that this could be an actual photo of a landscape. Although the photo is meant to resemble nature, it is born out of a digital world with the help of a small representation of nature—the original piece of wood that Blalock used to create the stamp. Therefore, with Baudrillard's stages of simulation in mind, it could be said that this photo masks the absence of basic reality. While the original wood that was used to create the stamp used by Blalock is in itself a part of nature, it has been used to create a landscape of dirt and greenery. Although closely related, they are different in the sense that the wood is not dirt, nor is it leaves. As a piece of artistic appropriation, Blalock has successfully disconnected the original piece of wood from its original context and given it a new way of representing nature.

Also featured at the exhibition was the Berlin-based photographer Natalie Czech, who makes clever use of the words and images of others in her appropri-

ation. Her 2013 image *A Poem by Repetition by Aram Saroyan* features the poem “A Poem by Repetition” by concrete poet Aram Saroyan over the iconic single artwork to Pink Floyd’s song “Money” from their 1973 album *The Dark Side of the Moon* (Fig 4).



Figure 4: Natalie Czech, *A Poem by Repetition by Adam Saroyan*, 2013, Chromogenic color prints.

The poem, which reads “Ney Mo Money,” is written with the font of the song’s artwork.

Different interpretations of the poem can allude to different sentiments regarding the importance of money—one might read the text as “Need More Money” while another may read it as “Hey, My Money!” Juxtaposed against this is the loaded meaning of Pink Floyd’s “Money;” an anti-capitalist sentiment that needs no explanation. Effectively, Czech is removing the iconic single artwork from its crystal-clear meaning and opening it up to interpretation via its poetic counterpart.

The previously mentioned artist, Blalock, presents a higher level of simulation in his 2013 work, titled *Shoe*. The photo is a pigmented ink jet print created with the use of a digital editing program. The photo itself consists of a mass-produced canvas bag in the center, sitting over a spread-out newspaper and plastic soda yokes. The digital editing program is used to create crudely drawn lines across the side of the

canvas bag that are meant to resemble shoe treads. However, it is evident in the photo that Blalock does nothing to disguise the fact that the shoe treads are not real. Instead, they are drawn as unevenly as possible, with one even escaping the supposed realm of the “shoe.” The purpose of this deliberate clumsiness is to illustrate the constructed nature of photographs—the inaccuracies of the photo might imply that Blalock is pointing out what he perceives to be obvious simulation in modern photography. Given the four stages of simulacra outlined in *Simulacra and Simulation*, this photograph could be interpreted as a simulation that bears little or no relation to any reality—the canvas bag looks enough like a shoe tread so that it can be recognized as such, but the materials themselves hold no semblance to an actual shoe.

Baudrillard describes the terms “dissimulation” and “simulation” as contrasting points: dissimulation is “to pretend not to have what one has” whereas simulation is “to feign to have what one doesn’t have” (3). Furthermore, he draws upon the analogy of a person who feigns illness; the person will, in simulation, exhibit symptoms that cannot be sourced by any doctor because of the fact that no source actually exists. Much like the source of the illness, then, the sources of the realities represented in *Shoe* cannot be found. One cannot find a shoe in Blalock’s studio. In order to understand this work as a piece of appropriation, one should reexamine the meaning of the term “dissimulation.” If dissimulation is to pretend not to have what one has, then is it not the same as appropriation in the sense that the artist is negating the original meaning of his/her resources? Blalock is pretending not to have a canvas bag or a set of uncouthly drawn lines in order to dissimulate those objects and reassign their meaning as a simulation of a shoe. In the act of dissimulation, he is appropriating the canvas bag and the lines by stripping them of their meaning.

The works of Blalock and Czech are similar in that none of them represent the

objective truth. Through digital editing and reconstruction of “reality,” they imply a set of signs that, at best, only imply the thing that they refer to. Furthermore, the artists make use of appropriation when they reassign the values of different images by placing them into a new situation. Essentially, these artists are working off of precedents that had been set by artists of the 1960s, 70s and 80s. Much like simulation, appropriation can be observed in a number of fields from architectural design to fashion. In photography, artists such as Sherman, Levine and Prince have laid groundwork for the concept of borrowing and image permutations that artists such as Blalock and Czech apply to their art.

Consider the work of Levine, a photographer whose work was “less concerned with the obvious ironies of simple appropriation than with the transmittal of knowledge of the original work through its replication” (Marincola 24). Her style of appropriation, which consisted of re-photographing copies of already well-known images by different artists, spoke to the dwindling room for originality in a society that is saturated with images. Is this not similar to Czech’s use of Pink Floyd’s iconic album cover in her piece *A Poem by Repetition by Aram Saroyan* to reintroduce the band’s anti-capitalist sentiments? In a sense, both Levine and Czech are borrowing for the sole purpose of restating what the original works have stated, albeit in a slightly altered context. Alternatively, Prince’s work highlights the unrealistic nature of advertisements by manipulating images multiple times by re-photographing, collaging and enlarging images until they were many levels of simulation away from their origin. Essentially, Prince’s goal was to emphasize the “sense of estrangement or unreality which is already implicit in mass media imagery” (Marincola 22). This estrangement can be felt in one of the previously described photographs from MOMA’s “Ocean of Images” exhibition. Much like Prince’s work, Blalock’s *Shoe* is a piece of manipulation—

there is a large gap between what Blalock aims to represent and what he is actually representing in the image.

Inevitably, the question is raised as to whether or not the use of appropriation through simulation can nevertheless render a work of art original. To try and answer this question, one should examine the issues of authenticity in photography. As far back as 1974, New York photographer Duane Michals showed that it is possible for the theme of inauthenticity to be authentic subject matter (Fig 5).



Figure 5: Duane Michals, *This Photograph is My Proof*, 1974.

In *This Photograph is My Proof*, Michals' questioning of the very notion of the authenticity of photographic documentary "proof" becomes authentic subject matter. The black-and-white photo, which features a clothed man and a woman embracing, smiling and facing the camera, while seated on a neatly made bed in a rather plain room, is accompanied by the following text handwritten as part of the print: "This photograph is my proof. There was that afternoon, when things were still good between us, and she embraced me, and we were so happy. It did happen, she did love me. Look see for yourself!" While one could assume that Michals is simply presenting evidence of a relationship that once was, the meaning of this photo delves deeper into trustworthiness of photographs. With the issue of increasingly radical experimentation in photographic procedures and processes, the issue of a photograph

-serving as documentary “proof” was being prominently questioned. If the purpose of the photo is to raise a question of authenticity, is it inauthentic as a piece of proof? In her essay titled “The Image World,” literary critic and essayist Susan Sontag discusses how the photograph can often create a substitute world, ultimately stating that photographic images are “material realities in their own right, richly informative deposits left in the wake of whatever emitted them, potent means for turning the tables on reality.” Even if a photograph’s reality is based on our reality, it possesses the power to cultivate an authentic reality of its own, possibly in contrast of our reality (Sontag 180).

The literary critic and essayist Roland Barthes contends that “Photography cannot signify (aim at a generality) except by assuming a mask... Society, it seems, mistrusts pure meaning: It wants meaning, but at the same time it wants this meaning to be surrounded by a noise (as is said in cybernetics) which will make it less acute”(35-36). Barthes further states how photographs with meanings that are too direct are often consumed aesthetically as opposed to politically. The ambiguity in the images created by Blaloch and Czech is a byproduct of the simulacra that is exhibited. This diversion from the direct message, as affirmed by Barthes, allows the photos to be consumed politically, not just aesthetically. Moreover, the idea of simulation in photography is not a new concept by any measure—it simply has taken a new direction through digital imaging. As pointed out by Sontag, “The further back we go in history, as E. H. Gombrich has observed, the less sharp is the distinction between images and real things; in primitive societies, the thing and its image were simply two different, that is, physically distinct, manifestations of the same energy or spirit”(155). Contemporary art is reiterating that sense of confluence between the actual and the imagined.

Ultimately, the art historian Geoffrey Batchen affirms the notion that photography, even with the use of digital manipulation, is still a product of its creator. Batchen's belief is that "While both concepts and relationships continue to endure, so surely will a photographic culture of one sort or another. Even if a computer does replace the traditional camera, the computer will continue to depend on the thinking and worldview of the humans who program, control, and direct it, just as photography now does" (19). Photography has always been at the hands of editing, from the early days of post-exposure manipulation of negatives up to the present-day use of digital editing.

In a time where simulation governs our perception, the identity of reality is doomed to be suspect. Coupled with the concept of appropriation in art, these simulations can apply themselves to a new meaning in order to create a new, authentic reality. Ultimately, however, these photographs still retain an essence of their original source. A person with a positive face does not cease to be him or herself entirely; the positive face is a mere variation on the likeness of said person. Yet through editing, a variation on the image is created—a simulation, no doubt, but one which either reflects or temporarily masks the essence of the original. The theories of simulation outlined by Baudrillard find their application in all corners of life, from museum galleries to newspaper advertisements and from literature to the world of business and networking. The recent photographic works of Blalock and Czech echo the appropriative concepts of past photographers who aimed to redefine images of advertising, movies and prior art into a different context. In doing so, they prove to be prime examples of the different levels of simulacra, ranging from reflections of reality to a state of simulation that represents something that is no longer real. Most importantly, however, they convey their message of verisimilitude—or falsehood—in a way that nevertheless possesses provocative layers

of meaning. The use of digital editing and post-exposure manipulation are variations on a tradition of post-exposure image alteration that have existed in the field of photography since its inception; it does not discredit the photographs. Instead, these procedures convey the artists' personalities while addressing shared concerns of our digitally dominated era.

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ISSN 2475-1545 (Print)

ISSN 2475-1553 (Online)

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The Bergen Scholarly Journal



ISSN 2475-1545 (Print)



ISSN 2475-1553 (Online)

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